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ABSTRACT
This thesis empirically explores the nature of the relationships between members of
formal and informal alliances. A pooled time series cross sectional data methodology
is employed to analyze those factors believed to have a significant impact on the
behavior of national governments in allotting funds for defense. Regression analysis
is performed on seventy-five countries over an eleven year period (1974-1984)
including both NATO and non-NATO members; communist and non-communist
nations; and developed and less-developed countries. The empirical results reveal
inconclusive evidence for the traditional view that an inverse relationship exists between
the military expenditures of allies. The distinction between formal and informal allies
provides no further evidence of support and exposes some of the weaknesses of this
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The purpose of this research is to test the explanatory power of factors that are
likely to have a significant influence on the defense spending of our allies and rivals.
The factors that will be tested for their degree of impact on military expenditures
include: gross national product (GNP), military expenditures of formal and informal
allies, military expenditures of rival countries, social expenditures, and constraints on
military expenditures imposed by treaty or constitution. These factors were selected
as potentially important determinants of defense spending after a thorough examination
of both the theoretical literature and prior empirical research.
This thesis topic is designed as an extension of a project completed by Dr.
Stephen L. Mehay and Dr. Rodolfo A. Gonzalez, "An Economic Model of the Supply
of Military Output," April 1987, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Their
project utilized the theory of bureaucracy to analyze the collective choice mechanism
for determining a country's military spending. Spillover effects on a nation's military
spending from its allies and rivals were investigated for one year of data (1982).
This study conducts an analysis similar to their research, but differs in two ways.
First, the sample consists of data over an eleven year period, 1974 -1985. Second, and
even more important, this study directly tests the extent of free riding behavior
occurring among formal allies and allies who are not members of formal alliances.
The primary purpose for testing for relationships between a nation's military
expenditures and the defense spending of her allies and rivals is to develop a
regression model that accurately predicts the behavior of national governments in
allotting funds for defense. Additionally, this research provides an understanding of
some of the factors that have the greatest impact on the military expenditure of a
nation.
The data base for this study was developed from selected data contained in the
World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer manual developed by The U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1986.
B. BACKGROUND
This thesis capitalizes on many of the same measures and methodologies
employed in the work of Dr. Mehay and Dr. Gonzalez. Both studies utilize regression
analysis techniques for testing the individual data bases to develop optimal models.
Dr. Mehay and Dr. Gonzalez used income, population, social spending, political
structure, volunteer force, and spending limitations to test for a nation's military
spending. Their model integrated economies of size in military output from both the
consumption (publicness) and production (scale) sides. This study is similar and builds
on their concepts by introducing more variables believed to have a significant impact
on a country's defense spending. Specifically, a distinction is made between a formal
ally and an informal ally. The end result is an improved model.
Their research discovered that while economies of size to national defense appear
to be important for western nations, they appear to be lacking in less developed
countries. This difference was thought to be due in part to the different weapons mix
between the two samples. The weapons mix among the western nations is weighted
toward deterrent weapons, but in comparison the less developed nations tend to favor
conventional forces and protective weapons.
The study completed by Dr. Mehay and Dr. Gonzalez resulted in a specific
regression model to explore an alternative decision making model that takes into
account autonomous preferences by government decision makers. Because only one
year of data was used and no distinction was made between formal and informal allies,
this may have negatively impacted the performance of their model.
C. PUBLIC GOOD
As in prior studies of defense expenditures, it is assumed that defense services
exhibit to a significant degree the characteristics of a public good. Public goods are
goods which are jointly consumed by individuals.
The notion of a pure public good is germane to this study and must be formally
defined. Todd Sandler, in his article entitled "Sharing Burdens in NATO," offers the
following definition:
A good is a pure public good when its benefits are nonrival and non- excludable.
The benefits of a good are nonrival whenever a unit of the good can be
consumed by one agent without detracting, in the slightest, from the consumption
opportunities still available to others from the same unit. Benefits that are
available to all agents once the good is provided are termed nonexcludable. [Ref.
l:p. 30]
Examples of public goods include firework displays, national defense, pollution-
control devices and street lighting. More than one person can simultaneously benefit
from the above goods without diminishing the value of the good to others, and it is
virtually impossible to exclude any individual from consuming the good once it is
provided.
D. THE SUBSTITUTION EFFECT
When the price of a good rises, ceteris paribus, the consumer is usually affected
in two principal ways. First, the consumer's real income or purchasing power is
reduced, because the higher price reduces the amount of commodities that can be
purchased. In addition, the price increase makes the good a relatively poorer bargain
compared to its substitutes, so the consumer substitutes other goods that are cheaper
in place of the now more expensive one. This second response is called the
substitution effect. [Ref. 2:p. 75]
Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser (1966) assume that the output of an
ally is a substitute good. They were among the first to argue that the pure public
good nature of national defense and differences in member size led to larger members
bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of the common defense of an alliance.
In other words, it was predicted that the smaller allies would free ride by relying on
the contributions of the larger allies for protection. The term free rider in this context
means that a country contributes less than her derived benefits would warrant.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II reviews the various theories developed to help explain the defense
expenditure of a nation. This chapter describes the theory and assumptions presented
by Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser. The non-cooperative model of Olson
and Zeckhauser has provided the theoretical basis for many subsequent studies and
alternative views. Some of those alternative views, such as those argued by Todd
Sandler and his colleagues, are presented.
Chapter HI discusses the model used to test the theoretical hypothesis. All
variables are fully explained and the problems, methodology, assumptions and
procedures for testing the data base are discussed. The model is very similar to the
one used by Dr. Mehay and Dr. Gonzalez in their study.
Chapter IV describes the sample selection and data collection procedures
employed in developing the data base. A list of the countries included in the analysis
and the rationale for their selection to certain sample groups is discussed. The table
of allies and rivals is constructed for all seventy-five countries included in this study.
Chapter V details the data analysis procedures used to test specific hypotheses.
The statistical tests address the central research question: Is there an inverse
relationship between a nation's military expenditure and that of its allies. Regression
models were constructed to separately address the central research question in the
context of various subsets of the data base.
Chapter VI presents a summary of the results, the final conclusions and
recommendations
.
H. THEORETICAL REVIEW OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES
A. FRAMEWORK
Economic analyses of a nation's military output have been organized around two
distinct but related lines of reasoning. The first approach, argued by Mancur Olson Jr.
and Richard Zeckhauser in 1966, focuses on the pure public good attribute of national
defense and discusses the free-riding behavior of smaller nations on large, defense-
producing nations. They suggest that the bureaucracy of formalized (military) alliances
creates recurring situations which make smaller nations unwilling to contribute to the
common defense in proportion to the share of benefits they receive. As a result, the
smaller nations force the larger ones to take on more of the organization's military
requirements. These larger, industrialized nations therefore bear a disproportionate
share of the burden.
The second line of reasoning has been based primarily on the studies of Todd
Sandler and his colleagues. Their approach argues that NATO defense activities
produce different types of weapons depending on the degree of publicness. In other
words, military alliances produce a mix of outputs, some of which are not purely
public. Their reasoning suggests that some defense expenditures will induce
complementary behavior among alliance nations rather than the substitution effects
envisioned by the Olson and Zeckhauser model.
1. General Qualifications
An important point often neglected in the burden sharing debate is that
efficiency requires a balance of contributions and benefits. In other words, there
should be a balance between the percent of a nation's contribution and the percent of
benefit received.
Ideally, what we would like to measure is total contribution relative to total
benefit. However, since it is difficult to accurately measure benefits, it is assumed that
GNP or GNP per capita can be used as a proxy (e.g., benefit from security is
measured by the wealth one stands to lose). Additionally, one assumes that total
contribution can be measured by defense expenditures. Using expenditures and GNP
only indicates whether there is free riding if both of these assumptions are true. If
there are other benefits (i.e., American drive for superiority, force projection, economic
spillovers, etc.) or other types of contributions (i.e., land, facilities, inconvenience to
population, etc.) then these measurements do not adequately measure the presence of
free riding. Both of these assumptions are adopted by convention for this analysis.
Another implicit assumption throughout the discussion on military
expenditures is that there should be proportional sharing of the defense burden in an
alliance. In other words, expenditures should be proportional rather than based on
sacrifice. However, tins is contrary to the U.S. income tax scheme which says that
sacrifice should be proportional. If this were true, one would expect wealthier nations
to contribute more (assuming diminishing marginal utility of income or wealth). As
well, many less wealthy countries might be bearing more than their share of sacrifice.
B. THE FIRST LINE OF INQUIRY
In the mid- 1 960 's, Olson and Zeckhauser postulated a clever hypothesis to
explain the disproportionate burden sharing observed among countries in the NATO
alliance. The NATO group was chosen because of its large amount of resources and
because it provided adequate data to test the implications of their model. They argued
that U.S. strategic nuclear weapons provided mostly public benefits that were nonrival
to the allies and also nonexcludable. That is, the nuclear deterrence provided by the
U.S. arsenal could underwrite the security of the other allies without diminishing the
deterrence provided to the United States itself.
When allies contribute toward an arsenal whose benefits are shared by all without
regard to payment, smaller allies have an incentive to ride free by relying on the
contributions of the larger allies for protection. Such selfish behavior allows the free
rider to spend its scarce resources on other things. Thus, the shared defense benefits
provided by a nation's allies are equivalent to an increase in the nation's income.
In great depth, the Olson and Zeckhauser argument purports to explain how, from
an economic vantage point, alliances operate. Its primary focus is on the NATO
countries, although the model utilized can be applied to other alliances. Measured as
either a percentage of their GNP or a percentage of their government budgets, smaller
nations expend significantly less of their budgets toward defense than do larger member
nations. If GNP is used as a proxy for the benefits of national security, the larger
countries contribute more than their proportionate share to the alliance while the
smaller nations contribute less in comparison to the benefits they derive. According
to Olson and Zeckhauser, their research proved that there was a significant "positive
correlation" between the size of a member's national income and the percentage of its
national income devoted to the common defense [Ref. 3:p. 277].
In a similar manner, it has been noted that the alliance does not adequately fulfill
its own established quota of military division requirements. The facts usually indicate
that it is the smaller nations that do not supply the necessary resources to meet their
quota requirements. The United States' contribution has increased beyond its quota to
balance the deficiency of other alliance members. Of course, this simply causes some
participants to benefit from their alliance membership without paying their dues. As
a result, the independence of the group is threatened due to the disproportionate
expenditure of resources by the larger nations in contrast to the smaller nations'
contributions.
There are various reasons to help explain this occurrence. Perhaps there exists
an American drive for superiority and dominance based on moral supremacy. Another
reason is obviously linked to how member nations manage and allot their resources to
meet such requirements. Clearly, the answer to NATO's disproportionality problem and
why it is not fully equipped to satisfy its own preestablished charter lies in the bosom
of how much (and why) these member nations give to the whole organization.
Throughout the discussion and analysis presented by Olson and Zeckhauser, it is
assumed that there will always be some degree of disproportionality involved.
However, there is one important case where they believe there will be no tendency
toward disproportionality. This would occur if defense became a superior good. A
superior good is one where expenditures on the good increases by as much or more
than income increases. Applying this definition to military spending, all of the increase
in income that a nation receives in the form of defense provided by allies is spent on
defense goods. In other words, as a nation gets more free defense from an ally, it
would not reduce its own military expenditure.
This special case could be an important one. Olson and Zeckhauser offer the
following: "During periods of all-out war or exceptional insecurity, it is likely that
defense is (or is nearly) a superior good, and in such circumstances alliances will not
have any tendency toward disproportionate burden sharing." [Ref. 3:p. 271]
Olson and Zeckhauser further argue that the defense output of allies yields a
collective security (public) good which is shared equally by all alliance members, but
whose production level depends on the separate expenditure decisions of each ally.
Each nation is assumed to choose its defense output without considering the spillover
effects its decisions have on the other members.
One rational explanation for this behavior stems from the concept of
suboptimality. As they (Olson and Zeckhauser) view alliance interactions, there will
always be a suboptimal amount of defense produced. In other words, even though a
specific amount of defense can be obtained from the collective contributions of alliance
nations, the collective effort will fall short of the optimal amount. It must be
emphasized that efficiency requires a balance of contributions and benefits. It is best
said by Olson and Zeckhauser [Ref. 3:p. 271]:
Although there is then one exception to the rule that alliance burdens are shared
disproportionately, there is no equivalent exception to the rule that alliances
provide suboptimal amounts of the collective good. The alliance output will
always be suboptimal so long as the members of the alliance place a positive
value on additional units of defense. This is because each of the alliance
members contributes to the point where its marginal rate of substitution for the
good equals the marginal cost of the good...There could be an optimal quantity
of the collective good only if the total value which all of the alliance members
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together placed on an additional unit of the good equalled marginal cost,...The
individual nations in an alliance would have an incentive to keep providing
additional alliance forces until the Pareto-optimal level is reached only if there
were an arrangement such that the alliance members shared marginal costs in
the same proportions in which they shared additional benefits (that is, in the
same ratio as their marginal rates of substitution of money for the good). When
there is such a marginal cost sharing scheme, there need be no tendency toward
disproportionality in the sharing of burdens.
According to Olson and Zeckhauser, one possible solution to the problem of
disproportionality and suboptimality is institutional changes that alter the pattern of
incentives. Suboptimal decision-making is a common characteristic of large
organizations. The vehicle, therefore, to change this outcome would be to change
policies. From this manipulation, it is possible that less of a disproportionate share of
the burden would be carried by the large, defense producing nations. Also according
to Olson and Zeckhauser, these policy changes "...at least have the merit that they help
to make the national interests of individual nations more nearly compatible with the
efficient attainment of the goals which groups of nations hold in common." [Ref. 3:p.
279]
Another plausible solution to the problem is to harness the "differences of
purpose" that already exist in an alliance or international organization. The model
implies that alliances and international organizations will not work efficiently regardless
of how complete the agreement and "community of interest" among the members.
Some differences of purpose increase the private, non-collective benefits and in doing
so they improve the working of the alliance. For example, many European NATO
members probably would have smaller military forces and contribute less to NATO if
it were not for their private interests and fears. In viewing the long-term effect, these
11
differences will alleviate the suboptimality and disproportionality problems and improve
the alliance. [Ref. 3:p. 279]
In another respect, part of the solution is in the analysis of why and how such
organizations exist. Olson and Zeckhauser [Ref. 3:p. 267] state that one purpose that
all such organizations must have is that of serving the common interests of member
states. In the case of NATO, the proclaimed purpose of the alliance is to protect the
member nations from aggression by a common enemy. The combined defense effort
of these countries contributes to the common defense of the group. Hence, we have
a collective consumption situation. Olson and Zeckhauser describe its characteristics:
Such a common objective is a collective good, since it has one or both of the
following properties: (1) if the common goal is achieved, everyone who shares
this goal automatically benefits, or in other words, nonpurchasers cannot feasibly
be kept from consuming the good, and (2) if the good is available to any one
person in a group it is or can be made available to the other members of the
group at little or no marginal cost. [Ref. 3:p. 267]
Critical to the first line of reasoning is the idea that an individual member acting
apart from the group usually has no incentive to provide optimal amounts of such
goods. Where the group interested in a public good is very large, and the share of the
total benefit that goes to any single individual is very small, usually no individual has
an incentive voluntarily to purchase any of the good [Ref. 3:p. 267]. In the case
where the group is small, members will usually have an incentive to provide for the
collective good, and to make appropriate sacrifices to do so, but usually they will tend
to provide only suboptimal amounts of this good. "There will also be a tendency for
the larger members - those that place a higher absolute value on the public good - to
bear a disproportionate share of the burden...." [Ref. 3:p. 268]
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Simply stated, the first line of reasoning explores the commodity or "good" of
military security considering its public good characteristics. The economists, Rodolfo
Gonzalez and Stephen Mehay, in their article, "An Economic Model of the Supply of
Military Output," describe it this way: "Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) argued that in
alliances the pure public good attribute of national defense and differences in member
size combine to create free riding behavior by smaller members." [Ref. 4:p. 2] In
essence, in an alliance the output of allies is a substitute for the amount a nation
spends on its own defense.
1. Assumptions
The Olson and Zeckhauser model revolves around the premise that countries
place a specific value on national defense at the expense of other goods (nondefense)
that could have been purchased. Naturally, in an alliance, the amount a nation spends
on defense will be affected to some extent by the amount its allies provide. Their
non-cooperative model of military alliances has several important assumptions that are
critical in justifying their conclusions.
The first assumption is that defense is in fact a pure public good. As such,
its enjoyment is shared by all in the alliance and it is not feasible (and sometimes not
even possible) to exclude any member from consuming it. The "free rider" problem
is based on this assumption.
Another assumption in the model is that all goods are "normal goods."
Normal goods are goods such that if a consumer's income increases, the number of
units purchased of the good also increases. However, even Olson and Zeckhauser [Ref.
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3:p. 279] admit that if defense became a "superior good" such as in "all-out war or
extreme insecurity," there would be no tendency toward disproportionality.
Throughout their reasoning, it is assumed that the "costs of defense are
constant to scale and the same for all alliance members." [Ref. 3:p. 271] However,
it is more accurate to consider that some types of weapon systems and ground forces
do have rising costs. Alternatively, other weapon systems have "undoubtedly striking
economies of large scale production...." [Ref. 3:p. 271] As a result, there will be
differences between the defense expenditures of large and small nations on these items.
Olson and Zeckhauser conclude that regardless of the differences in marginal costs
among countries, the basic premises of their argument are not altered.
Although not specifically cited in the literature, an implicit assumption in
their model as noted by the economists Gonzalez and Mehay [Ref. 5:p. 1] is that the
output of one nation does not enhance the marginal effectiveness of the alliance output.
In other words, the model completely rules out the possibility of complementarity
among members' defense outputs.
Another assumption in their model is that the military forces in an alliance
provide only the collective benefit of alliance security, when in fact they also provide
national, non-collective benefits to the nations that maintain them [Ref. 3:p. 272]. For
example, when the Soviet Union mobilized additional forces to suppress the
independence movement in Angola, a national goal unrelated to the purposes of the
WARSAW PACT, she simultaneously increased the total strength of the WARSAW
alliance. Olson and Zeckhauser [Ref. 3:p. 272] state that "in any situations in which
the military forces of alliance members provide important non-collective benefits as
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well as alliance benefits, the degree of suboptimality and the importance of the
disproportionaliry will decrease because the non-collective benefits give the member
nations an incentive to maintain larger forces."
A final qualifying assumption of the model is that alliance members do not
take into account the reactions of other members in their defense contributions. One
reason for this behavior, according to Olson and Zeckhauser [Ref. 3:p. 273], is that
alliances are often involved in situations that contain a strong element of irreversibility.
A second factor is the difference between market and non-market groups [Ref. 3:p.
273]. Market groups traditionally engage in price wars or cut-throat competition to
drive competitors out of the industry. However, non-market groups, such as alliances,
usually strive for large membership, since the supply of the collective good increases
as the membership increases.
C. THE SECOND LINE OF INQUIRY
The second approach to military spending has revolved around the research of
Todd Sandler and his colleagues. In contrast to the Olson and Zeckhauser non-
cooperative model, Sandler developed the "joint product" model in 1977. This model
emphasized a theory of military interdependence, allowing for the possibility of
complementarity between the defense spending of the members of an alliance. Since
the original joint product model, empirical analysis of these arguments has continued
to focus on specifying demand functions for defense output.
Sandler (1980) argues that his joint product model is the most comprehensive
model of alliance behavior because it includes private, impure public, and pure public
outputs of defense expenditures [Ref. 6:p. 425]. Moreover, he feels that because of
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changes since the Olson and Zeckhauser model (1966), the straightforward application
of the pure public good model is no longer appropriate for defense alliance behavior.
Sandler [Ref. 6:p. 426] states that "the change in NATO's military strategy, the
development of new weapon systems, and the increase of disputes exogenous to the
East-West split favor the application of the joint product model, since rivalry in
consumption, multiple outputs, benefit exclusion, and private benefits are increasingly
characterizing modem alliances."
Sandler and Murdoch surmise that complementarity among the joint products of
the NATO members may be the result of the move away from what is called mutual
assured destruction (MAD) towards the flexible response doctrine of the mid- 1 970 's.
In the latter case, NATO nations engage their security forces in multiple arenas to
avoid a full-scale nuclear confrontation. It is believed that any conflict provoked by
Warsaw Pact challenges will initially begin with the use of conventional and tactical
weapons followed by military armament exchanges with nuclear weapons. Therefore,
the perspective is of a progressive and sequential confrontation between national
powers.
In this vein, no longer can NATO countries rely on nuclear weapons' deterrence
to fend off security challenges. They must at a minimum be prepared to defend
themselves against conventional aggression. Hence, the concept of a flexible response
allows for the conventional and tactical response necessary in the early stages of a
European conflict. Sandler and Murdoch offer the following:
...the nuclear and non-nuclear arsenals contribute to each other's value; they
become complementary. This, therefore, implies a complementarity between the
military activities of the smaller European allies and the larger nuclear nations.
[Ref. 7:p. 90]
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According to this view, if a member nation does not keep pace with the military
activity of its allies, it could be inviting trouble. An opponent may take the opportunity
to gain an advantage by creating a confrontation on that ally's territory. In this
situation, of course, the conflict is considered to be conventional. Sandler and
Murdoch write [Ref. 7:p. 90]:
...with strong complementarity, an ally's military activity could increase in
response to greater alliance-wide military activities. In reality, the military
activity of a nation is quite closely measured by its military expenditures...
a
NATO ally is predicted to have less desire to free ride.
The joint product approach allows for a relationship of complementarity between
defense goods by introducing various defense commodities into the model. A
distinction is made between strategic and conventional forces in developing this model
of defense. Sandler and Forbes call attention to the fact that many nations have
different mixes of weapons, each with its own degree of publicness. They describe a
purely deterrent weapon as one with the sole purpose of conveying "a credible
retaliatory threat on behalf of an alliance" (e.g., Trident submarines, B-l bombers),
while weapons are classified as purely protective or damage-limiting when they are
deployed "to deny an enemy its military objective." [Ref. 6:p. 427] Another type of
weapon is called a mixed defense weapon. This is a weapon that satisfies both
deterrent and damage-limiting purposes such as multi-purpose aircraft and cruise
missiles.
The model suggests that the inherently different types of weapons and the
adoption of the doctrine of flexible response by NATO during the early 1970's caused
a complementarity relationship among alliance members. As a result, it appears that
the extent of free riding in the NATO alliance has diminished. Among NATO nations.
17
only a minority (Canada, Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) are found to act
in accordance with the free rider hypothesis advanced by Olson and Zeckhauser. [Ref.
8:p. 261]
1. Improving the Joint Product model
Todd Sandler and James C. Murdoch (1982) improve and refine the joint
product model so that it can better analyze nuclear war alliances. In particular, they
suggest that the refined models demonstrate that allies' responses to defense spillovers
depend upon the consumption relationship (i.e., complementarity or substitutability) of
the jointly produced defense outputs as well as the allies' income responsiveness [Ref.
8:p. 239].
Their research is centered around a theoretical model of a nuclear war
alliance. From this model, it is believed that when the jointly produced defense
outputs are complementary, allies may increase their defense expenditures in response
to the spill-ins from large defense producing nations. Spill-ins are the benefits received
from the defense expenditures made by another ally. Furthermore, it is suggested that
the stability and size of alliances are also related to the consumption relationship of the
jointly produced outputs." [Ref. 8:p. 237] Finally, they present the idea that the
influence of spill-ins (or spillovers) on both arsenal maintenance and the membership
size of the organization can be determined and traced to the "consumption relationship
of the jointly produced outputs." [Ref. 8:p. 239]
In the joint product model, an alliance is depicted "as relying upon an
arsenal that provides deterrence, damage-limiting protection (needed when deterrence
fails), and private benefits." [Ref. 8:p. 242] This model suggests that wealth is not the
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only variable that influences the patterns in defense expenditures. Damage-limiting
weapons (e.g., tanks, anti-ballistic missiles) can be partially rival in a sense between
allies. Such would be the case if they are positioned along a common border. Sandler
[Ref. 6:p. 427] purports that "when an arsenal of damage-limiting weapons is required
to protect a larger front or boundary as a new ally joins, a tiunning of forces results
from a spatial rivalry which detracts from the protection of the existing allies." These
weapons can be deployed elsewhere or withheld from engagement. In other words,
their services (or benefits) can be excluded. According to this line of reasoning, the
end-result is that the alliance enjoys "pure public (deterrence), impure public (damage-
limitation forces), and private benefits." [Ref. 8:p. 242]
Sandler's theoretical analyses suggest that the military expenditures of any
ally are a function of four separate factors. These include wealth, thinning, spill-ins,
and strategic strength.
The first factor, wealth, is a measure of an ally's gross domestic product.
Thinning, the second factor, is approximated by the ratio of an ally's military personnel
to its exposed border. This variable captures the potential density of the ally's armed
forces along its exposed perimeter. The third factor, spill-ins, is determined from net
NATO expenditures after subtracting the ally's own defense expenditures. The last
variable is the relative strategic strength of NATO. It is expressed by the ratio of U.S.
long-range missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) plus long range bombers to USSR long-
range missiles and bombers.
From the results, Sandler and Murdoch predict nations will not respond
positively to spill-ins when free riding is possible or when the jointly made products
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of defense are substitutes. However, if the outputs are complementary, the results
indicate that an ally will actually increase defense spending in reaction to the spill-
ins. They believe that the flexible response doctrine will cause a complementary
relationship between deterrent and damage-limiting weapons. Furthermore, this
complementary relationship should be particularly prevalent for those countries that
have colonial interests.
In a similar manner, Sandler and Murdoch (1984) examine some of the
major factors that influence a nation's demand for military spending. Their research
cites two primary findings in alliance activity among its members. The first is the
"free rider" concept whereby some in the alliance contribute a greater share of their
gross domestic product to military expenditures and thus carry more of a security
burden. This phenomena is consistent with the Olson and Zeckhauser model and
matches their description of disproportionality. The second observation made is that
there have been significant changes in the shares of military expenditure over time
(1960-1979). Specifically, they note that the military share gap has closed between all
of the relatively large and small nations and this closing is due to the dramatic
reductions in the shares of the nuclear allies. Of course this suggests that the extent
of the free rider problem in the NATO alliance has diminished.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has offered the two main views on the economic analyses of a
nation's military expenditure. Olson and Zeckhauser were the first to present a public
goods approach to the study of alliance behavior. They depicted NATO as sharing a
pure public good in the form of deterrence. Their study showed that responses to
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spill-ins only depended upon income responsiveness and that, in most situations, spill
-
ins caused allies to cut defense expenditures. This approach focuses on the pure public
good characteristic of national defense and emphasizes the substitution effect of military
expenditures in an alliance.
In contrast to this first line of inquiry, Todd Sandler and his colleagues offer a
second view suggesting that when the jointly produced outputs are complementary vice
substitutable, allies could increase their defense expenditures in response to spill-ins.
Thus, the joint product model emphasizes the complementary effect of defense




The model offered here attempts to portray inherently the decisions made by
government executives in defense expenditures. The theory can be applied to any
nation because clinically this framework targets those variables predicted to have a
strong, positive impact on the outcome of military expenditures.
Analogous to the model used in the Gonzalez and Mehay research, this study
assumes that there is an interaction or interdependence made among nations that are
rival and among nations that are allies.
Similar to the Gonzalez and Mehay work, this model offers two primary
advantages over previous economic research on national defense spending. First, the
model incorporates the interdependence of military decisions between rivals as well as
between allies. Secondly, prior research has concentrated on the spillover effects
between allies who are members of formal alliances, generally NATO. This narrow
focus omits consideration of nations that are operational allies even though they are not
members of formal alliances, and includes nations who are formal but not operational
allies. This research expands the scope of inquiry by investigating spillovers between
nations that can be defined as operational or informal allies, regardless of whether they
are members of formal alliances.
This study does not emphasize the type of good that is provided by a military
alliance, but rather that the good has a significant degree of publicness and yields
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benefit to all the members of the group. It is assumed that nations do not have to
belong to a formal alliance for the theory to apply. Since it is assumed that deterrence
is a public good, whether a country is formally participating in an alliance or not, they
are the benefactors of their own defense production along with the production of other
nations who they informally ally with. Olson and Zeckhauser write: "Another
assumption in the model developed was that the military forces in an alliance provide
only the collective benefit of alliance security, when in fact they also provide purely
national, non-collective benefits to the nations that maintain them." [Ref. 3:p. 272]
It should be clear that it is also assumed that defense has an element of
publicness (public good) both among members of a formal alliance and among nations
informally allied. In addition, the view toward defense is comprehensive. Though the
two basic research studies cited earlier discuss the issues of economies of size
(consumption and production) of weaponry, this study views military spending as a
whole. The issue is not the types of weapons that are produced, such as conventional
versus nuclear or tactical versus strategic. Rather, the pertinent issue is when national
officials make their fiscal decisions, which variables have the greatest influence on the
resulting defense spending policy. The Olson and Zeckhauser model assumes that the
costs of defense are constant to scale and the same for all alliance members. Although
military forces are composed of different types of equipment and manpower, it is still
unlikely that costs are constant and uniform. However, because the emphasis of this
study is on testing for relationships between a country's military expenditure and that
of its allies, the costs of defense are irrelevant and do not affect the model.
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B. THEORETICAL BASIS
There are numerous theories that have been developed and used to explain
national military expenditures. The basic premise of this research is that national
defense spending is a function of a nation's population (POP), income per capita (PCI),
government social expenditures (SE), military expenditures of formal allies (FA),
military expenditures of informal allies (LA), and the military expenditures of rival
countries (RTV). Written in a theoretical formula, the following is derived:
ME
lt
=f(POP it , PCIit , S£,.,, FA,.,, /A,.„ RIVul ). That is to say that:
i = a particular nation
t = time/specific year
t-1 = time lagged by one year
According to Gonzalez and Mehay [Ref. 4:p. 11], the reaction effects between
allies and rivals introduce potential simultaneity into the estimation of the above
formula. In addition, the construction of the variables for ally and rival spending
assumes that a reciprocal relationship exists between nations identified as allies and
rivals; that is, the set of nations identified as allies (or rivals) of a nation /' will also
have i as an ally (or rival).
However, it is questionable whether simultaneity is a serious concern in defense
spending patterns across nations. It is likely any reaction effect will occur with a
considerable lag since information on an ally and, especially, rival spending may not
be known with certainty during a nation's budgetary cycle. This reasoning suggests
that the proper specification of the above formula should incorporate lags in the ally
and rival variables.
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Following Murdoch and Sandler (1984), and Gonzalez and Mehay (1987), time
is lagged by one year for the military expenditures of both formal and informal allies,
the defense expenditures of rival countries, and government social expenditures to avoid
simultaneity.
The total military expenditures by formal and informal allies of nation i are net
of nation /'s military expenditures. Previous studies (i.e., Gonzalez and Mehay) have
proved this to be the best technique.
A nation is considered to be a "significant" rival to country i if two conditions
exist: (1) a territorial or political conflict exists between the two nations that may
induce either nation to employ armed force against the other; and (2) the ability of a
nation to resist an attack is not negligible. Condition (2) requires that a nation's armed
forces not be simply a token force.
Similarly, a given nation is considered to be a "significant" ally to country ; if
two conditions hold: (1) the relationship between the two countries, formal or
otherwise, is such that the nation can be relied upon to support i in an armed conflict
with a third party; and (2) the nation's potential military contribution in support of i
is not negligible. Memberships in formal alliances and bilateral defense treaties were
used in part in designating nations as allies and rivals. However, alliances and treaties
were ignored in those cases where evidence suggests that the signatories do not intend
to abide by an agreement. An example of the latter is the 14 Nation Treaty among
African nations.
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The variable ME represents a nation's total military spending in year t. The
variables FA, IA, and RTV are the total formal, informal, and rival military expenditures
respectively of country / in year t.
A nation's gross national product (GNP) is often used as a measure of its
national income. However, GNP is the product of per capita income and population.
Therefore, to form a more explanatory model, the variables per capita income (PCI)
and population (POP) are used as separate variables instead of combining them to form
total GNP.
If national income is held constant, an obvious trade-off will exist between social
and defense spending. Therefore, this study incorporates the amount of a country's
social spending measured as the annual non-military central government spending. The
variable social expenditures (SE) is calculated as the difference between a nation's
central government expenditures and its military expenditures.
The tradeoff between defense and social spending should impart a negative sign
to the SE variable. On the other hand, a positive sign for the social spending variable
could provide some indication of the government's general ability to tax the electorate
at a given income level.
Following the Gonzalez and Mehay study (1987), the nature of the constitutional
regime could have an important effect on military spending, independent of the external
military environment. This factor is controlled by including a dummy variable,
NONDEM, which equals unity when a country is classified as either a totalitarian or
authoritarian regime.
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A second dummy variable, CONSTR, is also included to capture those nations
whose military spending is constrained by treaty or constitution. This variable is set
equal to unity for three nations—Finland, Japan, and Austria.
The empirical model for estimating a nation's military expenditure is converted
to a log-linear (constant elasticity) form by taking the log of all the variables excluding
the dummy variables. This was necessary in order to perform the required regressions.
The model is used to test the explanatory power of the independent variables
against the dependent variable, military expenditures. A regression is performed over
an eleven year period on seventy-five countries using a statistical procedure known as
the cross-pooled regression method. Unlike a routine regression, all factors are
regressed over an eleven year period for all countries resulting in one regression line.
The advantage of this method over others, such as the time series regression, is that




The countries used in this study are chosen based upon the research conducted
by Rodolfo Gonzalez and Stephen Mehay [Ref. 4:p. 30] in their article, "An Economic
Model of the Supply of Military Output." These countries include North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) members; WARSAW Treaty Organization (WTO) nations;
and developed (superpowers) and less developed (Third World) countries. Additionally,
a distinction is made between democratic and non-democratic nations. The underlying
criteria for selecting and including these particular countries are the availability of data
and the capability to detect the relationship of interdependence with other nations. This
is encompassed in the bureaucratic concept argued by Gonzalez and Mehay.
Countries will participate in organizations for the purpose of obtaining a good
that, without the collective benefit of their membership, they could not independently
produce the same quantity or quality. Nations must and do expend the resources
required to procure whatever they deem to be the requisite amount of defense, security
preparation, and protection for pre-war confrontations and full-scale war engagements.
It is the contention of this research that military spending is affected by the size of the
country, its per capita wealth, and the defense expenditures of its allies and rivals.
Olson and Zeckhauser focus on the workings of alliances, but their comments are still
relevant to the discussion at hand. They write: "In an alliance, the amount a nation
spends on defense will be affected by the amount its allies provide.. .the more defense
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this nation's allies provide, the further the cost constraint decreases and the less it
spends on defense...The amount of defense that this nation provides will in turn
influence the defense output of its allies...." [Ref. 3:p. 268] Therefore, the nations that
provide an ample spectrum of characteristic backgrounds and influences as just
discussed, were chosen for this study.
B. DATA PRESENTATION
The Appendix lists the 75 countries and relevant cross-sectional data selected
for this research. The data covers an eleven year period, 1974-1984. Although data
were collected for 141 nations, missing data for some variables reduced the usable
sample to 75. The cross-sectional data utilized for this research was taken from the
annual World Military Expenditures & Arms Transfer manual 1986, published by the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. All data are presented in
constant 1983 dollars. Variables used in Appendix A include:
YR = calendar year
ME = total government military expenditures in million dollars
GE = total government expenditures in million dollars
POP = population in millions
PI = income per capita in dollars
BK = country-specific designations such as NATO
* = data not available
Table 1 lists the relevant countries used over the eleven year period, 1974-1984,
with their formal allies (FA), informal allies (LA), and rivals (RV).
C. QUALIFICATIONS
The military expenditure data may be of uneven accuracy and completeness. This




LIST OF COUNTRIES (Allies & Rivals)
Country Name FA IA RV
1. Argentina NA NA 13,71
2. Australia 33,39,52,71,72 30,63 54
3. Austria NA NA NA
4. Bangladesh NA 25 43







6. Bolivia NA NA NA
7. Brazil NA NA NA
8. Bulgaria WTO NA NATO
9. Burkina Faso NA NA NA
10. Burma NA NA NA
11. Cameroon NA NA NA
12. Canada NATO NA WTO
13. Chile NA NA 1,46
14. Colombia NA NA 73
15. Czechoslovakia WTO NA NATO
16. Central African NA NA NA
17.
Republic
Denmark NATO NA WTO
18. Ecuador NA NA 46
19. East Germany WTO NA NATO
30
Number Country Name FA IA RV
20. Finland NA NA 54
21. France NATO NA WTO
22. Greece NATO (except 67) NA WTO,67
23. Guyana NA NA 73
24. Hungary WTO NA NATO
25. India NA 54 43,76
26. Indonesia NA 2,30 77
27. Ireland NA NA NA
28. Israel NA 72 54,59,78,79
29. Italy NATO NA WTO
30. Japan NA 2,72 54
31. Kenya NA 53,71,72,
80
54,81
32. Luxembourg NATO NA WTO
33. Malaysia 2,39,52,71 72 54,77
34. Mali NA NA NA
35. Malta NA NA NA
36. Mexico NA 72 NA
37. Nepal NA NA NA
38. Netherlands NATO NA WTO
39. New Zealand 2,33,52,71,72 NA 54
40. Nigeria NA NA NA
41. Norway NATO 57 WTO
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Number Country Name FA IA RV
42. Oman NA 70,82,83
84,85
79
43. Pakistan NA 72,76 25,54
44. Papa New Guinea NA NA NA
45. Paraguay NA NA NA
46. Peru NA NA 13,18
47. Philippines NA 72 NA
48. Poland WTO NA NATO
49. Portugal NATO NA WTO
50. Romania WTO NA NATO
51. Senegal NA 21 86,87
52. Singapore 2,33,39,71 NA 77
53. Somalia NA 31,72 81
54. Soviet Union WTO 77,88,89 NATO,2,28,
30,57,76
55. Spain NATO NA WTO
56. Sri Lanka NA NA NA
57. Sweden NA 41 54
58. Switzerland NA NA NA
59. Syria NA 54 28,72,90
60. South Africa NA NA 91,92
61. South Korea NA 72 54,89
62. Tanzania NA NA NA
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Number Country Name FA IA RV
63. Thailand NA 2,72 77
64. Togo NA NA NA
65. Trinidad-Tobago NA NA NA
66. Tunisia NA 21 93
67. Turkey NATO (except 22) NA WTO,22
68. Uganda NA 62 NA
69. Uruguay NA NA NA
70. United Arab Emirates NA 42,82,83,
84,85
79
71. United Kingdom NATO,2,33,
39,52
NA WTO/77




73. Venezuela NA NA 14,23
74. West Germany NATO NA WTO
75. Yugoslavia NA NA 54







77. Vietnam 78. Iraq
81. Ethiopia 82. Bahrain
85. Saudi Arabia 86. Guinea







the recent deemphasis of the collection of such data by the Agency for International
Development, a major source of data in the past. For example, there are indications
or reasons to believe that the military expenditures reported by some countries (i.e.,
Ecuador and Syria) consist mainly or entirely of recurring or operating expenditures
and omit most capital expenditures, including arms purchases.
Particular problems arise in estimating the military expenditures of communist
countries due to the exceptional scarcity and ambiguity of released information. Data
on Soviet military expenditures are based on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
estimates of what it would cost in the United States in dollars to develop, procure, staff
and operate a military force similar to that of the Soviet Union. These estimates are
the best available; in fact, there are no alternative estimates available that can inspire
equal confidence.
Unlike Western countries where statistics on the National Budget, Gross National
Product, Industrial Output, Trade, Balance of Payments, etc. are accurately reported,
WARSAW Pact nations treat such accounts as state secrets. This is not to say that
official statistics are not published, but too frequently they are stagnant values repeated
from one year to the next. To gain a true perspective of the problems, successes or
failures in the various categories, Western analysts have turned to examining available
data and intelligence for use in estimating the actual values.
For WARSAW Pact countries other than the Soviet Union, the estimates of
military expenditures are from the publication "East European Military Expenditures,"
published by the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe. These
military expenditures refer only to the officially announced state budget expenditures
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on national defense. Therefore, these figures understate total military expenditures in
view of defense outlays by non-defense agencies of the central government, local
governments, and economic enterprises. Possible subsidization of military procurement
may also cause understatement. However, since the bias is consistent among the




This chapter addresses the central research question: Is there an inverse
relationship between a country's military expenditure and that of its allies? The
hypotheses tested are:
Ho: There is no inverse relationship between a country's military expenditure and
that of its formal allies. Mathematically, this is expressed as b4 > 0.
H,: There is an inverse relationship between a country's military expenditure and
that of its formal allies. Mathematically, this is expressed as b4 < (i.e.,
the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero and is negative).
Hq: There is no inverse relationship between a country's military expenditure and
that of its informal allies. Mathematically, this is expressed as b5 > 0.
H,: There is an inverse relationship between a country's military expenditure and
that of its formal allies. Mathematically, this is expressed as b5 < (i.e.,
the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero and is negative).
In the alternative hypotheses (H,), both b4 and b5 are stated as less than zero.
This implies that their values are negative. Given these are negative and significant,
and taking into account the other variables in the model, the decision maker could
postulate that an inverse relationship does exist.
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The values b4 and b3 in the above expressions refer to the coefficients of the
variables Formal Allies and Informal Allies in the basic model. The loglinear form of




lt) + b^og(PCIit) + b 3log(S£t.,) + bjopvi) +
bJlogCM.,) + btlogdUV^)
To fully support the "free rider" theory of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), we
expect the coefficients b4 and b5 to be negative and significant. In addition, b4 should
be more negative than b5 .
The level of significance is very important in any statistical analysis. The analyst
must first determine how certain he or she wants to be in accepting or rejecting the
null hypothesis (H ). In other words, the decision maker establishes the risk level he
or she is willing to tolerate in terms of rejecting a true null hypothesis. If Ho is
rejected when in fact it is true, a Type I error is committed. The probability of
making a Type I error is given by a, also called the level of significance. That is,
P(Type I error) = a.
The larger the a, the more likely it is that Ho will be rejected falsely. The analyst
determines the size of a. For example, if he wants to be 99% sure of his result, an
a = .01 is selected; if he wants to be 95% sure, an a = .05 is selected. The a value
should always be set prior to collection of the data. For all the tests in this study, an
a - .05 is used.
B. THE STATISTICAL REGRESSION
Routine computer regressions were run on the full sample of seventy-five
countries and on six individual subsamples over the eleven year period, 1974-1984.
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The full sample was further divided into six subsamples over the same period to
determine the impact that the six independent variables had on these smaller groupings
of nations.
In order to establish these smaller groupings of countries, all seventy-five
countries were given politico-economic labels such as LDC (less-developed country),
WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization member), Western nations (advanced market
economies) or NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization member). The final six
subsample groupings are based on these title designations and include the following:
(1) NATO; (2) Western; (3) WTO; (4) LDC; (5) WTO & LDC; (6) Western & LDC.
The following countries are included in the various subsamples for this study:
NATO: United States, Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, West Germany,
Norway, United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Canada,
Belgium.
Western: NATO countries plus Australia, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland.
WTO: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Soviet Union.
LDC: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burma, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia,
South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia.
C. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
For all of the regressions, the dependent variable is the log military expenditures
of the countries included in the particular sample. The independent variables are
logarithms of population, per capita income, social expenditures, military expenditures
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of formal allies, military expenditures of informal allies, rival military expenditures,
constrained (present in only some samples), and nondemocratic (present in only some
samples).
In each regression a group of statistics is generated to help determine the
suitability of the model and guide the researcher in his acceptance or rejection of the
hypothesis. The following is a brief description of each:
r
2
- the coefficient of determination. This measures the proportion of variation
in the dependent variable that is explained by the variation in the independent variables
in the regression model.
Adj r2 - This is an adjusted value to reflect both the number of predictor or
explanatory variables in the model and the sample size.
Parameter Estimate - gives an estimate for the value of the coefficients.
Standard Error - measures how much the parameter estimates would vary from
one collection of data to the next. Standard errors can be used to construct confidence
intervals about the parameter estimates.
T for HO - gives the t-value for testing the null hypothesis that the parameter
equals zero. These t-values are equal to the parameter estimates divided by their
standard errors. They are used to test if the parameter estimates differ significantly
from zero. As a general rule, if the t-value is greater than + 1.96, the coefficient can
be accepted as significant at the .05 level.
Prob > [T] - gives the "p-value" which is the probability of observing a t-value
more extreme than the t-value obtained from the regression. The p-value is extremely
important because it is the "observed level of significance," the smallest level at which
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Ho can be rejected for a given set of data. The analyst need only compare these p-
values with a to determine whether or not the given variable is a significant
explanatory one. If the p-value is less than a, H„ can be rejected.
F Value, Prob > F - gives the test statistic and p-value associated with a test of
the hypothesis that at least one variable in the overall model explains a significant
portion of the variation in the data. In other words, it allows the entire model to be
tested for significance. As a general rule, if the F-statistic is greater than 5.0, the
model can be accepted as statistically significant.
1. NATO subsample
Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis of the NATO countries.
The adjusted r2 value indicates that 96.92 percent of the variation in the model is
explained by the independent variables. Likewise, since "Prob>F" is less than the
significance level of a = .05, one can conclude that the regression as a whole is
significant.
The variable IA is negative and significant which supports the theory of
Olson and Zeckhauser. The variable FA is also negative but not significant.
Therefore, their theory can not be completely supported given the regression results.
2. WESTERN subsample
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis of the Western countries
subsample. The adjusted r2 value indicates that a high percentage of the variation in
the model is explained by the independent variables. Likewise, since "Prob>F" is less




NATO ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
DEP VARIABLE: LOGME LOG MILITARY EXPENDITURES
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE F VALUE P
MODEL 6 550.55640 91.75940003 855.727
ERROR 157 16.83507233 0.10722976
C TOTAL 163 567.39147
ROOT MSE 0.3274596 R- SQUARE 0.9703





PARAMETER STANDARD T FOR HO:
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE ERROR PARAMETERS PROB>[T]
INTERCEP 1 -1.69892785 0.37650582 -4.512 0.0001
LOGFA 1 0.001769204 0.003271349 -0.541 0.5894
LOGIA 1 -0.01620329 0.002599416 -6.233 0.0001
LOGRIV 1 0.003956906 0.003232395 1.224 0.2227
LOGSE 1 0.002651345 0.02105472 0.126 0.9000






LOGFA 1 LOG FORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGIA 1 LOG INFORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGRIV 1 LOG RIVALS MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGSE 1 LOG SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
LOGPI 1 LOG PER CAPITA INCOME
LOGPOP 1 LOG POPULATION
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TABLE 3
WESTERN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
DEP VARIABLE: LOGME LOG MILITARY EXPENDITURES
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE
MODEL 6 710.24063 118.37344
ERROR 245 43.14840383 0.17611593
C TOTAL 251 753.38904
ROOT MSE 0.4196617 R-SQUARE





















































LOGFA 1 LOG FORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGIA 1 LOG INFORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGRIV 1 LOG RIVALS MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGSE 1 LOG SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
LOGPI 1 LOG PER CAPITA INCOME
LOGPOP 1 LOG POPULATION
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The variables FA and IA are both negative and significant which fully
supports the theory of Olson and Zeckhauser. Additionally, the variable FA is more
negative than the variable IA and this was expected since the "free rider" effect is
hypothesized to be stronger in a formal alliance.
3. WTO subsample
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analysis of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization. The adjusted r2 value of .9980 is extremely high and indicates that
almost one hundred percent of the variation in the model is explained by the
independent variables. Likewise, since "Prob>F" is less than the significance level of
a = .05, the regression as a whole is significant.
The variables FA and IA are both negative and significant which fully
supports the theory of Olson and Zeckhauser. However, the variable LA is more
negative than the variable FA and this tends to contradict their theory.
The variable RIV is negative and significant which suggests that an inverse
relationship exists between a communist country's military expenditures and the military
expenditures of its rivals.
4. LDC subsample
Table 5 shows the results of the regression analysis of the Less Developed
Countries subsample. The adjusted r2 value is the lowest of all the subsamples, yet it
indicates that 79.6 percent of the variation in the model is explained by the
independent variables. Likewise, since "Prob>F" is less than the significance level of
a = .05, the regression as a whole appears to be significant.
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TABLE 4
WTO ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
DEP VARIABLE: LOGME LOG MILITARY EXPENDITURES
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE
MODEL 6 137.68101 22.94683494
ERROR 68 0.25216819 0.003708356
C TOTAL 74 137.93318
ROOT MSE 0.06089627 R-SQUARE






















































LOGFA 1 LOG FORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGIA 1 LOG INFORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGRIV 1 LOG RIVALS MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGSE 1 LOG SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
LOGPI 1 LOG PER CAPITA INCOME
LOGPOP 1 LOG POPULATION
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Neither variable FA nor IA are negative. There is no evidence of an inverse
relationship, therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
There is no evidence of an inverse relationship between the variables SE and
ME. However, the variable SE is significantly positive and possibly indicates that in
general, for LDC nations, their defense spending increases with an increase in social
spending.
Another observation is that the variable NONDEM is positive and
significant. This may suggest that a totalitarian or authoritarian regime has a positive
effect on the military expenditures of non-democratic LDC nations. It is easier for
non-democratic regimes to spend more on defense. These results are consistent with
the Gonzalez and Mehay research.
5. WTO & LDC subsample
Table 6 shows the results of the regression analysis of the WTO/LDC
subsample. The adjusted r2 value increases with the addition of WTO countries to the
LDC subsample. At .8683, it indicates that a higher percentage of the variation in the
model is explained by the independent variables. Likewise, since "Prob>F" is less than
a, the regression as a whole appears to be significant.
Neither variable FA nor IA are negative. There is no evidence of an inverse
relationship, therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the subsample does
not support the theory of Olson and Zeckhauser. The variable IA is significantly
positive and may suggest that there is a positive relationship between a country's




LDC ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
DEP VARIABLE: LOGME LOG MILITARY EXPENDITURES
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE
MODEL 7 1281.41969 183.05996
ERROR 478 322.41748 0.67451356
C TOTAL 485 1603.83717
ROOT MSE 0.8212877 R-SQUARE







PARAMETER STANDARD T FOR HO:
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE ERROR PARAMETERS PROB>[T]
INTERCEP 1 -5.01962139 0.36038240 -13.929 0.0001
LOGFA 1 0.002845855 0.004144597 0.687 0.4926
LOGIA 1 0.005661896 0.003459463 1.637 0.1024
LOGRIV 1 0.000733747 0.003907063 -0.188 0.8511
LOGSE 1 0.06693371 0.02597946 2.576 0.0103
LOGPI 1 1.13985850 0.03861522 29.518 0.0001






LOGFA 1 LOG FORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGIA 1 LOG INFORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGRIV 1 LOG RIVALS MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGSE 1 LOG SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
LOGPI 1 LOG PER CAPITA INCOME




WTO AND LDC ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
DEP VARIABLE: LOGME LOG MILITARY EXPENDITURES
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE
MODEL 7 2231.87132 318.83876
ERROR 553 333.77039 0.60356309
C TOTAL 560 2565.64171
ROOT MSE 0.7768932 R-SQUARE








































LOGFA 1 LOG FORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGIA 1 LOG INFORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGRIV 1 LOG RIVALS MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGSE 1 LOG SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
LOGPI 1 LOG PER CAPITA INCOME
LOGPOP 1 LOG POPULATION
NONDEM 1 NON-DEMOCRATIC
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In the combined subsample, there is no evidence of an inverse relationship
between the variable SE and the variable ME. However, the variable SE remains
significantly positive and may indicate that defense spending increases with an increase
in social spending.
The dummy variable NONDEM also remains positive and significant leading
to the conclusion that a totalitarian or authoritarian regime may have a positive effect
on the military expenditures of non-democratic LDC/WTO nations.
Although not central to this study, the results of this subsample also show
that a nation's military expenditures increase as its income and population increases.
6. WESTERN & LDC subsample
Table 7 shows the results of the regression analysis of the combined
Westem/LDC countries. The adjusted r2 value increases with the addition of Western
countries to the LDC subsample. Now, 87.77 percent of the variation in the model can
be explained by the independent variables. As well, since "Prob>F" is less than a, the
regression as a whole is significant.
The addition of Western countries to the LDC sample causes no change to
the coefficients of the variables FA or LA. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
The SE variable remains positive and significant which may indicate that the
military expenditures of these nations increase as the social expenditures increase.
Similarly, the dummy variable NONDEM remains positive and significant.
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TABLE 7
WESTERN AND LDC ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
DEP VARIABLE: LOGME LOG MILITARY EXPENDITURES
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE
MODEL 8 2777.64719 347.20590
ERROR 729 382.20250 0.52428326
C TOTAL 737 3159.84969
ROOT MSE 0.7240741 R-SQUARE







PARAMETER STANDARD T FOR HO:
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE ERROR PARAMETERS PROB>[T]
INTERCEP 1 -4.51679781 0.22152643 -20.389 0.0001
LOGFA 1 0.003769554 0.003020645 1.248 0.2125
LOG I
A
1 0.000851205 0.002378724 0.358 0.7206
LOGRIV 1 -0.001269960 0.002786616 -0.456 0.6487
LOGSE 1 0.04448357 0.01877921 2.369 0.0181
LOGPI 1 1.06494446 0.02090740 50.936 0.0001
LOGPOP 1 1.03402256 0.02018309 51.232 0.0001






LOGFA 1 LOG FORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGIA 1 LOG INFORMAL ALLIES MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGRIV 1 LOG RIVALS MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LOGSE 1 LOG SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
LOGPI 1 LOG PER CAPITA INCOME




The dummy variable CONSTR is negative and significant. This indicates
that for those countries constrained by treaty or constitution, their military expenditures
are limited. This is consistent with the prior research of Gonzalez and Mehay.
7. FULL sample
Table 8 shows the results of the regression analysis for the Full sample of
seventy-five countries. The adjusted r2 value is high and "Prob>F" is less than a
indicating that the regression as a whole is significant.
Both FA and IA variables are positive. As a result, the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected and the theory of Olson and Zeckhauser is not supported.
The variable SE is significantly positive and may indicate that as a nation's
social spending increases, its military expenditures also rise.
As expected, the dummy variable NONDEM is positive and significant and
the dummy variable CONSTR is negative and significant. Both are consistent with the
Gonzalez and Mehay research.
D. MULTICOLLINEARITY
In multiple regression analysis, the regression coefficients often become less
reliable as the degree of correlation between the independent variables increases. If
there is a high level of correlation between them, a problem called "multicollinearity"
exists [Ref. 9:p. 672].
Multicollinearity is essentially a sample phenomena in the sense that even if the
independent variables are not linearly related in the population, they may be related in
the particular sample of study. It may happen that in any given sample some or all
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TABLE 8
FULL SAMPLE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
DEP VARIABLE: LOGME LOG MILITARY EXPENDITURES
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE
MODEL 8 3442.50095 430.31262
ERROR 804 392.84748 0.48861627
C TOTAL 812 3835.34843
ROOT MSE 0.6990109 R-SQUARE







PARAMETER STANDARD T FOR HO:
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE ERROR PARAMETERS PROB>[T]
INTERCEP 1 -4.53199003 0.20549388 -22.054 0.0001
LOGFA 1 0.003501692 0.002687869 1.303 0.1930
LOGIA 1 0.001863448 0.002062609 0.903 0.3666
LOGRIV 1 0.001317279 0.002426025 -0.543 0.5873
LOGSE 1 0.03369359 0.01615709 2.085 0.0374
LOGPI 1 1.07283749 0.01986904 53.995 0.0001
LOGPOP 1 1.05650440 0.01792181 58.951 0.0001
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of the independent variables are so highly collinear that one cannot isolate their
individual influence on the dependent variable.
Multicollinearity is a matter of degree and not of type. The meaningful
distinction is not between its presence or absence, but between its various degrees.
Therefore, the researcher measures the degree of multicollinearity in a particular
sample.
Table 9 shows the results of the collinearity diagnostics test for the full sample
of seventy-five countries. The eigenvalue and condition number give an overall
indication of the degree of multicollinearity present. The "bottom line" condition
number shows the cumulative effect of multicollinearity. As a general rule of thumb,
a "bottom line" condition number greater than 30 means that multicollinearity could be
a problem in the sample. When this number is large, the problem is said to be "ill-
conditioned"; when this number is extremely large, the estimates may have a fair
amount of numerical error [Ref. 9:p. 672].
As shown in Table 9, the test yields a condition number of only 21.7 which
indicates that the sample has a relatively low degree of multicollinearity. This was
expected because the multiple regression had very few of the indicators of
multicollinearity, namely high standard errors, relatively small computed t-values, and
relatively large Prob>[T] values.
E. SUMMARY
Table 10 summarizes the various regression results. Of the six subsamples,
WTO and Western fully support the theory of Olson and Zeckhauser. In these




VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR
CONDITION PROP PROP PROP PROP PROP
NUMBER EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP LOGFA LOG IA LOGRIV LOGSE
1 4.561723 1.000000 0.0007 0.0035 0.0098 0.0001 0.0013
2 1.554812 1.712875 0.0000 0.0661 0.0000 0.1493 0.0002
3 0.945646 2.196344 0.0000 0.0000 0.0503 0.0815 0.0000
4 0.772934 2.429368 0.0000 0.0756 0.4270 0.0070 0.0000
5 0.708613 2.537231 0.0003 0.0009 0.0046 0.0827 0.0009
6 0.236938 4.387799 0.0042 0.4159 0.3976 0.4336 0.0152
7 0.185740 4.955777 0.0021 0.1144 0.0455 0.1861 0.0022
8 0.023909 13.812743 0.0017 0.3172 0.0648 0.0000 0.5821
9 0.0096857 21.702010 0.9911 0.0064 0.0004 0.0597 0.3980
VAR PROP VAR PROP VAR PROP VAR PROP
NUMBER LOGPI LOGPOP NONDEM CONSTR
1 0.0012 0.0083 0.0083 0.0021
2 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0965
3 0.0000 0.0001 0.3250 0.2800
4 0.0001 0.0024 0.0060 0.1531
5 0.0000 0.0129 0.5412 0.3020
6 0.0041 0.0379 0.0028 0.0654
7 0.0122 0.8126 0.0122 0.0002
8 0.4952 0.0892 0.0913 0.0386
9 0.4871 0.0362 0.0133 0.0621
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of the variable IA. The NATO subsample partially supports their theory because both
coefficients were negative. The results indicate the "free riding" pattern of some
nations on the defense output of others. However, the "free rider" theory cannot be
completely supported because all the subsamples and the full sample should have
yielded similar results.
The theory of Olson and Zeckhauser postulates that there is an inverse
relationship between the military expenditures of nations and their allies. According
to the theory, this inverse relationship applies to formal and informal allies. However,
as table 10 shows, there is inconclusive evidence for this hypothesis, particularly during
the period 1974-1984.
The "joint product" model of Sandler may be supported in those cases where
the coefficient of both variables, FA and IA, are positive. There are four
samples/subsamples where this occurs: Full sample, LDC, WTO/LDC, and
Westem/LDC. However, only one of the coefficients (IA for WTO/LDC) is significant
at an a - .05. Therefore, the Sandler argument cannot be fully supported either.
Although not central to this study, the results show that there is no evidence of
an inverse relationship between a nation's income and its military expenditures.
Likewise, the results reveal no evidence of an inverse relationship between a nation's
population and its military expenditures. In all the samples the coefficients of the
Population and Income variables were positively significant and may suggest that as
a nation's income and population increase, its military expenditures also increase.
The coefficient of the variable Social Expenditures was significantly positive in
four samples: Full sample, LDC, WTO/LDC, and Westem/LDC. These results may
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ADJ R* .8966 .9692 .9980 .7960
s = significant at .10
ss = significant at .05
(standard errors in parentheses)
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TABLE 10 cont.
Variable Western WTO + LDC Western + LDC
FA -0.0156ss 0.0027 0.0038
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IA -0.0151ss 0.0071ss 0.0008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
RIV 0.0021 -0.00003 -0.0012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SE 0.0135 0.0474ss 0.0444ss
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
PI 0. 6156ss 1.1647ss 1.0649ss
(0.045) (0.035) (0.021)
POP 1.1532ss 1.0229ss 1.0340ss
(0.020) (0.024) (0.020)
NONDEM NA 0.4209ss 0.4570ss
(0.102) (0.106)
CONSTR NA NA -1.1331ss
(0.144)
ADJ R2 .9413 .8683 .8777
s = significant at .10
ss = significant at .05
(standard errors in parentheses)
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suggest that the less developed countries increase their social expenditures with an
increase in military expenditures. This of course contradicts the trade-off argument
between social and defense spending.
The coefficient of the Rival variable was negative in all the regressions except
NATO and Western. Of particular note, it was significant in the WTO subsample.
This would indicate that as the defense spending of a rival (NATO) increased, the
communist countries spent less on defense or vice versa.
In all the samples where the NONDEM and CONSTR variables were applicable,
their coefficients were significant. The NONDEM variable was consistently positive
and the CONSTR variable was consistently negative. The significance of these two
dummy variables must not be overlooked. They provide an indication that the type of
political regime and whether a nation uses conscription or volunteer armed service
affects its military expenditures.
Computer regressions were mn on the full sample and six subsamples for
different time periods between 1974 and 1984. The purpose of these regressions was
to determine if other factors relating to time period, such as the "flexible response
doctrine" of the early 1970's or the Reagan defense build-up initiatives of the early
1980's, played a major role in the relationship of military expenditures of nations. The
regression results were essentially the same as those for the entire eleven year time
period. Therefore, one can conclude that specific year or time period was not a
significant factor affecting a country's defense spending in relation to the defense




The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute describes the meaning of
military expenditure in the following way:
Military expenditure figures, presented in different ways, have a variety of uses,
including the measurement of the economic burden of these expenditures and the
assessment of the trend in a nation's military strength. Moreover, the
international comparison of military expenditures influences opinions about how
much should be spent in the future. And, in military alliances, the relative
economic burden of these expenditures between member nations is a frequently
discussed, and often contentious, issue. ..As a general rule aggregate military
expenditure is considered to be made up of the following components: 1) pay
and allowances of military personnel, 2) pay of civilian personnel, 3) operations
and maintenance (O&M), 4) procurement, 5) research and development (R&D),
and 6) construction. In addition, in many or most cases the following activities
are also regarded as military expenditure: 7) pensions to retired military
personnel, 8) military aid, 9) civil defense, 10) para-military forces, and 11)
military aspects of activities that are acknowledged as having a joint civil/military
function, for example, space or atomic energy. By and large it is the expenditure
aggregate made up of items 1 to 11 that is evaluated internally and compared
internationally. The main point to be borne in mind is that the economic impact
of the military is more pervasive than an analysis of explicit military expenditure
would suggest. [Ref. 10:p. 5]
Distinct from this vein of thought, this research has attempted to reveal
"significant" factors that were likely to have an influence on the outcome of a nation's
military spending. It is inherently implied that when a nation makes expenditures for
its security it will have less to spend in other areas of budgeted government spending.
The idea of opportunity cost underlies this premise.
According to The Stockholm Research Institute, opportunity cost is a concept in
economics that "stems from the fundamental postulate that resources are scarce." A
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corollary of scarcity is that the employment of resources in one activity has a "cost"
in terms of the output these resources might have produced in some other activity.
[Ref. 10:p. 9]
The Research Institute further states that confining the analysis to specified
military expenditure omits some potentially important aspects of the opportunity cost
of the military. Specifically, to the extent that governments (a) allocate expenditures
other than those explicidy labeled as military or (b) intervene in the private sector or
(c) disrupt the pattern of international trade with military considerations in mind, there
will be an additional cost in the sense that, from an economic and social viewpoint,
resources will be misallocated both nationally and internationally. The Institute's
approach to estimating opportunity cost is to take each major category of military
expenditure and ask the following question: "Assuming a transfer of these military
resources to civilian uses, is there any reason to suppose that the value of civilian
output would be substantially different from the actual sum of (military) expenditure
in these areas." [Ref. 10:p. 91
There has been much research in the area of military expenditure patterns of
alliances. According to Olson and Zeckhauser [Ref. 3:p. 268]:
When a nation decides how large a military force to provide in an alliance, it
must consider the value it places upon collective defense and the other,
nondefense, goods that must be sacrificed to obtain additional military forces...In
an alliance, the amount a nation spends on defense will be affected by the
amount its allies provide.
The theme presented here is the traditional view and seems to hold true throughout
most of the literature written on military alliances.
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This study assumed that if members of an alliance increase or decrease their
spending for security, it will affect their allies defense spending. Because defense is
considered to be a "public good," an increase in the defense output by one member
encourages another member to reduce its military output. The relationship among
alliance members, however, is not proportional.
In contrast to the traditional view, Todd Sandler and his colleagues suggest that
when the jointly produced outputs are complementary, allies could increase their
defense expenditures in response to spill -ins. Commenting on the Olson and
Zeckhauser model, Sandler [Ref. 8:p. 240] offers the following:
They depicted NATO as sharing a pure public good in the form of deterrence,
which relies on the credible threat of retaliation to forestall hostilities between
opposing alliances. The punishment threat associated with deterrence is nonrival
in consumption since additional allies can share this threat without diminishing
the deterrence provided to existing allies...In particular, their model predicted that
disproportionate burdens would be shouldered by the large, rich allies as the
poorer allies rode free on the richer countries' defense contributions.
This study also assumed that because of the "public good" nature of defense
smaller and less wealthy nations would take advantage of the alliance contributions of
their larger and wealthier counter-parts.
This research focused on eight variables thought to have a significant influence
on government decisions in the area of defense spending. These variables included:
the size of a country's population (POP), income per capita (PI), government social
expenditures (SE), military expenditures of formal allies (FA), military expenditures of
informal allies (IA), military expenditures of rival countries (RIV), non-democratic
nations (NONDEM), and countries constrained by treaty or constitution (CONSTR).
The CONSTR variable applied only to Japan, Austria, and Finland.
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In the case of the variable population, intuitively it should be assumed that the
larger a nation, the more capital resources it may have and will probably spend on
defense. This of course, assumes that the country considers the commodity of security
as a "normal good." In other words, the more dollars a nation has available to spend,
the more it will allot to obtain a greater quantity of this good. In their research,
Gonzalez and Mehay conclude that there will be a proportional or more than
proportional (depending on the presence of economies of size) increase between defense
spending and corresponding changes in the size of a nation's population [Ref. 4:p. 19].
According to these two economists, there have been major deficiencies and
inadequacies with prior models.
Although the coefficient of the variable population was positive and significant
in all samples as expected, the results do not necessarily conclude that larger countries
may be more or less efficient than smaller ones in their expenditures. The significant
point is that the evidence may suggest that a positive relationship exists between
military expenditures and the population of a country.
The coefficient of the variable per capita income was positive and significant in
all samples. These results are consistent with prior research on military expenditures.
The coefficient of the variable social expenditures was positive in all samples and
significant in the following four: Full sample, LDC, WTO/LDC, and Western/LDC.
It was expected that the trade-off between defense and social spending would impart
a negative sign to this variable. However, these results may indicate that there is a
positive relationship between the social and military expenditures of many nations,
particularly the less developed countries.
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A possible explanation for this positive relationship would be the ability of the
government to tax its people or control the majority of the nation's resources as in the
case of a communist regime. This line of reasoning is supported by the results
because the coefficient of the variable social expenditures was positive in all samples.
The coefficient of the Rival variable was negative and significant in the WTO
subsample. This seems to indicate that as the defense spending of a rival increased,
the WARSAW pact countries spent less on defense. Perhaps the contrary is true, as
the communist countries spent more on defense, their rivals spent less. This last line
of reasoning is plausible because if the trend in a rival country (i.e., US) over time is
in the opposite direction of a WTO nation, this would impart a negative sign to the
RIV variable. Such would be the case when NATO decreased its military expenditures
during the aftermath of the Vietnam War in the 1970's and the Soviet Union increased
its military spending.
The coefficients of the NONDEM and CONSTR dummy variables were
significant in all applicable samples. The NONDEM variable was consistently positive
and the CONSTR variable was consistently negative. These results were expected and
are consistent with the Gonzalez and Mehay study.
The coefficients of the variables FA (military expenditures of formal allies) and
IA (military expenditures of informal allies) were negative in three samples: NATO,
WTO, and Western. This states clearly that the results from some of the samples lend
support to the Olson and Zeckhauser view of an inverse relationship between the
military expenditures of allies, but the results from other samples do not.
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The results of this study are uniquely tied to country classifications. The effects
of FA, LA, and RTV are based on the definition of what constitutes a formal ally, an
informal ally or a rival. Different classifications could have yielded dissimilar results.
According to the theory, the inverse relationship applies to formal and informal
allies alike. However, there is inconclusive evidence for this hypothesis, particularly
during the period 1974-1984. It is possible that for a particular period in history (i.e.,
1960's) alliance members behaved as the theory suggests; but today, twenty-three years
after the Olson and Zeckhauser research, the world environment has changed.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
This study is a first attempt into an uncharted area for thesis research. It should
be repeated using different conceptualizations of country classifications to determine if
the relationships found in this study are stable. Further research in this area is needed,
but particular attention should be focused on the classification of the less-developed
countries (LDC) to alleviate the possibility that the results may be incomplete and
misleading. Additionally, only variables that have the fullest scope of sample data
should be used in the model. The variable CONSTR did not encompass enough of a
sampling to prove conclusively its influence and value in the model since it was
composed of only three countries. Nevertheless, the results exposed some of the




YR ME GE POP PI BK
Australia:
1974 2599 24820 13.6 8880 WEST
1975 2672 30990 13.8 8897 WEST
1976 2731 34310 13.9 9002 WEST
1977 3040 35780 14.1 9142 WEST
1978 2981 35520 14.2 9098 WEST
1979 3052 35710 14.4 9392 WEST
1980 3593 39570 14.6 9716 WEST
1981 3818 40950 14.8 9859 WEST
1982 4028 42170 15.1 9897 WEST
1983 4308 45120 15.3 9651 WEST
1984 4502 48420 15.5 9990 WEST
Austria:
1974 535 17470 7.6 7108 WEST
1975 597 18820 7.6 6990 WEST
1976 626 20250 7.6 7388 WEST
1977 648 20970 7.6 7689 WEST
1978 694 22880 7.6 7764 WEST
1979 734 23840 7.6 8172 WEST
1980 731 24630 7.6 8432 WEST
1981 726 25400 7.6 8420 WEST
1982 808 25910 7.6 8510 WEST
1983 890 27350 7.6 8830 WEST
1984 891 27160 7.6 8892 WEST
Belgium:
1974 2003 28730 9.8 7467 NATO
1975 2175 31810 9.8 7285 NATO
1976 2326 34480 9.8 7685 NATO
1977 2391 36130 9.8 7759 NATO
1978 2560 38760 9.8 7999 NATO
1979 2622 40530 9.8 8142 NATO
1980 2712 42010 9.8 8286 NATO
1981 2801 45590 9.9 8155 NATO
1982 2750 46120 9.9 8242 NATO
1983 2672 46470 9.9 8242 NATO
1984 2580 46610 9.9 8372 NATO
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YR ME GE POP PI BK
Canada:
1974 5108 59950 22.4 11680 NATO
1975 5039 65410 22.7 11630 NATO
1976 5288 64860 23.0 12130 NATO
1977 5667 65470 23.3 12220 NATO
1978 6018 69180 23.6 12530 NATO
1979 5630 68590 23.8 12770 NATO
1980 5727 71050 24.1 12800 NATO
1981 5922 76000 24.4 13060 NATO
1982 6532 80250 24.7 12320 NATO
1983 6563 83190 24.9 12600 NATO
1984 7350 89840 25.2 13100 NATO
Denmark:
1974 1112 17080 5.0 9498 NATO
1975 1183 17390 5.1 9367 NATO
1976 1162 17220 5.1 9984 NATO
1977 1192 17680 5.1 10110 NATO
1978 1235 18370 5.1 10180 NATO
1979 1264 19690 5.1 10420 NATO
1980 1320 21560 5.1 10300 NATO
1981 1355 22760 5.1 10150 NATO
1982 1379 24120 5.1 10370 NATO
1983 1375 24900 5.1 10620 NATO
1984 1349 25440 5.1 10990 NATO
Finland:
1974 479 10100 4.7 8172 WEST
1975 570 12030 4.7 8158 WEST
1976 511 12450 4.1 8144 WEST
1977 536 12840 4.2 8123 WEST
1978 558 12550 4.4 8290 WEST
1979 622 13320 4.7 8915 WEST
1980 719 13530 5.3 9392 WEST
1981 676 13720 4.9 9486 WEST
1982 740 14660 5.0 9695 WEST
1983 843 15530 5.4 9935 WEST
1984 764 15180 5.0 10150 WEST
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YR ME GE POP PI BK
France:
1974 15950 151100 52.5 8145 NATO
1975 16420 163200 52.8 8111 NATO
1976 17090 171800 53.0 8508 NATO
1977 18110 176700 53.2 8736 NATO
1978 19090 187200 53.4 9027 NATO
1979 19620 197300 53.6 9303 NATO
1980 20210 201400 53.9 9364 NATO
1981 20990 217700 54.1 9353 NATO
1982 21280 235300 54.4 9452 NATO
1983 21650 235600 54.6 9442 NATO
1984 21600 241000 54.8 9510 NATO
West Germany:
1974 20180 151100 62.0 9007 NATO
1975 19940 164600 61.8 8879 NATO
1976 20000 171500 61.5 9396 NATO
1977 19900 175700 61.4 9682 NATO
1978 20520 180800 61.3 10040 NATO
1979 20880 186400 61.3 10480 NATO
1980 21390 199600 61.6 10650 NATO
1981 22080 206300 61.7 10620 NATO
1982 21930 206900 61.6 10500 NATO
1983 22130 207500 61.4 10680 NATO
1984 22020 210000 61.2 11020 NATO
Greece:
1974 1467 7843 9.0 3026 NATO
1975 1903 8538 9.0 3165 NATO
1976 2045 9784 9.2 3328 NATO
1977 2157 10570 9.3 3401 NATO
1978 2196 11270 9.4 3571 NATO
1979 2132 11490 9.5 3661 NATO
1980 1954 12330 9.6 3695 NATO
1981 2404 13910 9.7 3641 NATO
1982 2377 12770 9.8 3596 NATO
1983 2195 14680 9.8 3555 NATO
1984 2575 15340 9.9 3613 NATO
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YR ME GE POP PI BK
Ireland:
1974 179 5880 3.1 4313 WEST
1975 249 6155 3.2 4303 WEST
1976 222 6392 3.2 4302 WEST
1977 236 6692 3.3 4510 WEST
1978 250 7419 3.3 4687 WEST
1979 253 8017 3.4 4701 WEST
1980 276 8834 3.4 4890 WEST
1981 270 9560 3.5 4933 WEST
1982 322 10300 3.5 4840 WEST
1983 312 10320 3.5 4781 WEST
1984 308 10390 3.6 4841 WEST
Italy:
1974 7916 121200 55.2 5555 NATO
1975 7331 137500 55.6 5306 NATO
1976 7221 136800 55.8 5593 NATO
1977 7619 144100 56.1 5686 NATO
1978 7824 143900 56.2 5829 NATO
1979 8202 155700 56.4 6092 NATO
1980 8635 174900 56.5 6326 NATO
1981 8803 177600 56.5 6301 NATO
1982 9312 183500 56.6 6246 NATO
1983 9481 200800 56.8 6196 NATO
1984 9771 209000 57.0 6330 NATO
Japan:
1974 6586 116700 110.2 7325 WEST
1975 7430 125200 111.6 7419 WEST
1976 7945 137000 112.8 7719 WEST
1977 8405 151700 113.9 8050 WEST
1978 9036 171000 114.9 8385 WEST
1979 9702 188000 115.9 8749 WEST
1980 9868 199000 116.8 9095 WEST
1981 10330 208600 117.6 9396 WEST
1982 10950 214400 118.4 9644 WEST
1983 11600 222100 119.3 9899 WEST
1984 12280 226700 120.0 10410 WEST
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YR ME GE POP PI BK
Luxembourg
1974 26 1100 0.4 10750 NATO
1975 31 1379 0.4 10610 NATO
1976 32 1449 0.4 10900 NATO
1977 33 1596 0.4 11260 NATO
1978 35 1593 0.4 11740 NATO
1979 36 1679 0.4 12420 NATO
1980 42 1767 0.4 12210 NATO
1981 43 1818 0.4 12240 NATO
1982 42 1829 0.4 12690 NATO
1983 41 1833 0.4 12500 NATO
1984 41 1773 0.4 13030 NATO
Netherlands:
1974 3650 53470 13.5 8845 NATO
1975 3803 58600 13.7 8605 NATO
1976 3759 61340 13.8 9011 NATO
1977 4196 63810 13.9 9172 NATO
1978 4012 66830 13.9 9337 NATO
1979 4256 70500 14.0 9463 NATO
1980 4175 73520 14.1 9462 NATO
1981 4266 76150 14.2 9322 NATO
1982 4246 77750 14.3 9141 NATO
1983 4257 79910 14.4 9219 NATO
1984 4360 80450 14.4 9338 NATO
New Zealand:
1974 340 7413 3.0 6888 WEST
1975 354 8716 3.1 6813 WEST
1976 331 7660 3.1 6803 WEST
1977 348 8099 3.1 6500 WEST
1978 346 8494 3.1 6514 WEST
1979 339 7977 3.1 6617 WEST
1980 396 8249 3.1 6740 WEST
1981 449 8972 3.1 6947 WEST
1982 469 9312 3.2 6833 WEST
1983 466 9975 3.2 7050 WEST
1984 454 10120 3.2 7298 WEST
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YR ME GE POP PI BK
Norway:
1974 1210 15600 4.0 9859 NATO
1975 1332 16880 4.0 10230 NATO
1976 1372 19590 4.0 10720 NATO
1977 1417 20770 4.0 11030 NATO
1978 1537 21790 4.1 11380 NATO
1979 1549 22700 4.1 11850 NATO
1980 1513 22560 4.1 12380 NATO
1981 1525 21700 4.1 12460 NATO
1982 1602 22650 4.1 12420 NATO
1983 1699 22540 4.1 12890 NATO
1984 1623 22870 4.1 13400 NATO
Portugal:
1974 1192 3011 9.1 1790 NATO
1975 813 3571 9.4 1635 NATO
1976 662 4300 9.6 1693 NATO
1977 614 6216 9.7 1774 NATO
1978 625 5018 9.7 1812 NATO
1979 661 4856 9.8 1913 NATO
1980 700 5404 9.8 1975 NATO
1981 707 5851 9.9 1951 NATO
1982 711 6657 9.9 1974 NATO
1983 693 6973 9.9 1970 NATO
1984 658 6979 10.0 1894 NATO
Spain:
1974 3666 29510 35.2 3979 NATO
1975 3805 32200 35.6 3968 NATO
1976 3553 31530 36.0 4028 NATO
1977 2603 37460 36.4 4105 NATO
1978 2594 39970 36.9 4132 NATO
1979 2767 42850 37.2 4118 NATO
1980 2949 45330 37.5 4141 NATO
1981 3039 50460 37.8 4076 NATO
1982 3227 34720 38.1 4060 NATO
1983 3335 42040 38.3 4065 NATO
1984 3512 45900 38.6 4119 NATO
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Sweden:
1974 2779 27940 8.2 10060 WEST
1975 2731 28270 8.2 10240 WEST
1976 2693 31030 8.2 10310 WEST
1977 2559 33190 8.3 10040 WEST
1978 2676 35990 8.3 10130 WEST
1979 2780 38250 8.3 10550 WEST
1980 2736 39020 8.3 10650 WEST
1981 2779 41160 8.3 10510 WEST
1982 2863 41980 8.3 10530 WEST
1983 2888 44770 8.3 10760 WEST
1984 2831 44430 8.3 11050 WEST
Switzerland:
1974 1890 16130 6.5 15330 WEST
1975 1775 16870 6.4 14250 WEST
1976 1991 18450 6.3 14270 WEST
1977 1905 18650 6.3 14730 WEST
1978 1863 18720 6.3 14710 WEST
1979 1980 19250 6.4 15080 WEST
1980 1994 19730 6.4 15680 WEST
1981 1983 19430 6.4 15930 WEST
1982 2034 19820 6.5 15610 WEST
1983 2055 20420 6.5 15730 WEST
1984 2130 21240 6.4 16220 WEST
Turkey:
1974 1388 6943 39.5 904 NATO
1975 2278 8749 40.5 962 NATO
1976 2607 10060 41.5 1018 NATO
1977 2562 12330 42.4 1040 NATO
1978 2373 12390 43.3 1045 NATO
1979 1958 13300 44.2 1009 NATO
1980 1928 11610 45.1 977 NATO
1981 2291 11440 46.2 991 NATO
1982 2562 11870 47.3 1014 NATO
1983 2469 12390 48.4 1027 NATO
1984 2385 13550 49.5 1061 NATO
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United Kingdom:
1974 20590 164800 56.2 7366 NATO
1975 20150 177600 56.2 7262 NATO
1976 20860 175000 56.2 7523 NATO
1977 20320 165300 56.2 7612 NATO
1978 20490 172900 56.2 7888 NATO
1979 21100 178100 56.2 8019 NATO
1980 22010 178800 56.3 7799 NATO
1981 20770 178600 56.4 7684 NATO
1982 22040 186600 56.3 7806 NATO
1983 24170 193700 56.4 8088 NATO
1984 24570 193000 56.4 8270 NATO
United States:
1974 163400 539100 213.9 13100 NATO
1975 157900 601700 216.0 12850 NATO
1976 148700 630800 218.0 13360 NATO
1977 155600 653300 220.2 13930 NATO
1978 155800 678200 222.6 14410 NATO
1979 161400 692700 225.1 14710 NATO
1980 174200 753000 227.7 14520 NATO
1981 190200 804600 230.0 14860 NATO
1982 205400 821700 232.3 14250 NATO
1983 217200 856000 234.5 14520 NATO
1984 229200 866900 236.7 15380 NATO
Israel:
1974 5352 13660 3.3 6206 LDC
1975 6155 14810 3.4 6257 LDC
1976 6340 15920 3.4 6202 LDC
1977 5976 16490 3.5 6122 LDC
1978 5181 15570 3.6 6263 LDC
1979 6922 18950 3.7 6458 LDC
1980 7364 20000 3.8 6441 LDC
1981 6225 21770 3.8 6648 LDC
1982 5707 21400 3.9 6564 LDC
1983 6308 27050 4.0 6585 LDC
1984 6966 26650 4.0 6345 LDC
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South Koreii:
1974 1723 6458 36.0 1102 LDC
1975 1985 7532 36.7 1158 LDC
1976 2728 8919 37.3 1300 LDC
1977 3083 10010 37.9 1442 LDC
1978 3608 11060 38.4 1558 LDC
1979 3309 12410 39.0 1636 LDC
1980 3714 12670 39.6 1529 LDC
1981 4044 14560 40.1 1606 LDC
1982 4238 15590 40.7 1668 LDC
1983 4390 15730 41.4 1838 LDC
1984 4437 16690 42.0 1963 LDC
Malta:
1974 6 258 0.3 1656 LDC
1975 10 347 0.3 1978 LDC
1976 9 338 0.3 2263 LDC
1977 10 327 0.3 2498 LDC
1978 9 352 0.3 2681 LDC
1979 * * 0.3 2867 LDC
1980 6 360 0.4 3005 LDC
1981 8 424 0.4 3134 LDC
1982 11 460 0.4 3266 LDC
1983 13 467 0.4 3202 LDC
1984 11 442 0.4 3279 LDC
Argentina:
1974 1049 14440 25.6 2480 LDC
1975 1357 13570 26.1 2428 LDC
1976 1989 12410 26.5 2373 LDC
1977 2155 11460 26.9 2483 LDC
1978 1952 12630 27.4 2359 LDC
1979 2237 13560 27.9 2473 LDC
1980 2463 14560 28.3 2440 LDC
1981 2374 16060 28.8 2183 LDC
1982 3620 13980 29.3 2001 LDC
1983 2745 18360 29.7 2009 LDC
1984 2250 13050 30.2 2024 LDC
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Bangladesh:
1974 86 863 74.7 110 LDC
1975 69 647 76.2 11 LDC
1976 145 1359 77.9 12 LDC
1977 209 1701 80.4 10 LDC
1978 208 1606 82.9 14 LDC
1979 154 1726 85.5 16 LDC
1980 160 2072 88.1 14 LDC
1981 176 1893 90.6 18 LDC
1982 200 1918 93.3 15 LDC
1983 260 2011 95.9 16 LDC
1984 239 2479 98.6 18 LDC
Bolivia:
1974 92 614 4.7 1172 LDC
1975 122 691 4.8 1226 LDC
1976 131 815 4.9 1268 LDC
1977 126 854 5.1 1277 LDC
1978 148 917 5.2 1281 LDC
1979 150 903 5.3 1232 LDC
1980 176 977 5.4 1174 LDC
1981 210 927 5.6 1136 LDC
1982 105 1418 5.7 953 LDC
1983 74 694 5.9 924 LDC
1984 116 2157 6.0 893 LDC
Brazil:
1974 1814 27080 106.0 1375 LDC
1975 1726 31010 108.7 1408 LDC
1976 1996 34150 111.3 1506 LDC
1977 1692 42400 114.0 1552 LDC
1978 1556 45100 116.9 1588 LDC
1979 1419 44750 119.9 1643 LDC
1980 1441 51020 123.0 1708 LDC
1981 1424 55550 126.3 1623 LDC
1982 1917 59650 129.6 1579 LDC
1983 1726 61420 132.9 1479 LDC
1984 1719 60570 136.3 1505 LDC
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Bulgaria:
1974 3827 17240 8.7 5198 WTO
1975 3786 19200 8.7 5615 WTO
1976 3880 17660 8.8 5765 WTO
1977 3944 17590 8.8 5718 WTO
1978 3755 19670 8.8 5788 WTO
1979 3752 19940 8.8 6051 WTO
1980 3777 19480 8.9 5850 WTO
1981 3902 22720 8.9 6075 WTO
1982 4327 23380 8.9 6210 WTO
1983 4310 22430 8.9 6043 WTO
1984 4381 23080 9.0 6231 WTO
Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta):
1974 10 89 5.5 148 LDC
1975 23 110 5.6 147 LDC
1976 26 129 5.7 158 LDC
1977 27 128 5.8 155 LDC
1978 30 128 5.9 163 LDC
1979 26 158 6.0 172 LDC
1980 26 149 6.1 174 LDC
1981 29 165 6.3 178 LDC
1982 30 169 6.4 174 LDC
1983 29 145 6.6 167 LDC
1984 29 168 6.7 162 LDC
Burma:
1974 138 500 29.6 125 LDC
1975 140 492 30.2 128 LDC
1976 145 528 30.8 133 LDC
1977 159 607 31.4 137 LDC
1978 161 696 32.1 143 LDC
1979 173 708 32.7 147 LDC
1980 183 833 33.4 157 LDC
1981 199 894 34.1 163 LDC
1982 188 976 34.8 168 LDC
1983 190 954 35.5 171 LDC
1984 189 987 36.2 177 LDC
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Cameroon:
1974 47 458 7.3 428 LDC
1975 51 577 7.5 416 LDC
1976 59 643 7.7 425 LDC
1977 51 629 7.9 454 LDC
1978 63 734 8.1 494 LDC
1979 69 756 8.3 538 LDC
1980 75 824 8.6 598 LDC
1981 63 1247 8.8 660 LDC
1982 67 1311 9.0 681 LDC
1983 137 1674 9.2 705 LDC
1984 134 1691 9.5 727 LDC
Central African Republic:
1974 14 159 2.0 331 LDC
1975 13 149 2.0 325 LDC
1976 13 121 2.1 331 LDC
1977 14 133 2.1 335 LDC
1978 14 134 2.2 335 LDC
1979 14 132 2.3 318 LDC
1980 14 124 2.3 298 LDC
1981 15 124 2.4 284 LDC
1982 15 147 2.4 283 LDC
1983 13 139 2.5 258 LDC
1984 * * 2.6 273 LDC
Chile:
1974 838 5895 10.0 1713 LDC
1975 700 5334 10.2 1432 LDC
1976 620 4812 10.4 1468 LDC
1977 680 5699 10.5 1598 LDC
1978 766 6069 10.7 1703 LDC
1979 713 5944 10.9 1810 LDC
1980 757 6268 11.0 1914 LDC
1981 828 6977 11.2 1964 LDC
1982 776 6192 11.4 1594 LDC
1983 759 6000 11.6 1563 LDC
1984 790 6659 11.8 1597 LDC
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Colombia:
1974 277 3305 23.6 1161 LDC
1975 338 3670 24.1 1158 LDC
1976 273 3261 24.6 1187 LDC
1977 223 3450 25.1 1221 LDC
1978 244 3879 25.5 1304 LDC
1979 341 4478 26.0 1355 LDC
1980 394 5119 26.5 1387 LDC
1981 380 5494 27.0 1383 LDC
1982 458 5746 27.6 1355 LDC
1983 505 5453 28.2 1343 LDC
1984 555 5569 28.7 1344 LDC
Czechoslovakia:
1974 6286 32870 14.7 7110 WTO
1975 6449 35900 14.8 7280 WTO
1976 6239 37610 14.9 7365 WTO
1977 6306 99630 15.0 7679 WTO
1978 6370 36540 15.1 7689 WTO
1979 6267 36640 15.2 7768 WTO
1980 6518 37400 15.3 7904 WTO
1981 6731 40820 15.3 7944 WTO
1982 7202 39260 15.4 8024 WTO
1983 7271 40280 15.4 8070 WTO
1984 7388 40950 15.5 8298 WTO
Ecuador:
1974 173 1055 6.8 1181 LDC
1975 214 1100 7.0 1260 LDC
1976 235 1254 7.2 1326 LDC
1977 236 1412 7.5 1378 LDC
1978 310 1256 7.7 1425 LDC
1979 269 1246 7.9 1437 LDC
1980 265 1766 8.1 1454 LDC
1981 274 2080 8.4 1464 LDC
1982 245 2028 8.6 1406 LDC
1983 200 1683 8.9 1327 LDC
1984 197 1737 9.1 1313 LDC
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East Germany:
1974 7789 55770 16.9 7636 WTO
1975 8136 57610 16.9 7974 WTO
1976 8277 60650 16.8 8177 WTO
1977 8367 63000 16.8 8492 WTO
1978 8494 66010 16.8 8577 WTO
1979 8643 69600 16.7 8894 WTO
1980 8791 73050 16.7 9074 WTO
1981 9197 76790 16.7 9399 WTO
1982 9720 81420 16.7 9321 WTO
1983 9966 84690 16.7 9420 WTO
1984 10330 89010 16.7 9769 WTO
Guyana:
1974 14 198 0.8 688 LDC
1975 39 296 0.8 768 LDC
1976 47 389 0.8 768 LDC
1977 33 276 0.8 750 LDC
1978 21 249 0.8 743 LDC
1979 19 313 0.8 726 LDC
1980 22 386 0.8 728 LDC
1981 24 424 0.8 712 LDC
1982 27 * 0.8 628 LDC
1983 22 380 0.8 596 LDC
1984 23 * 0.8 632 LDC
Hungary:
1974 3216 31480 10.5 6085 WTO
1975 3171 36100 10.5 6194 WTO
1976 2906 35020 10.6 6188 WTO
1977 2840 35980 10.6 6591 WTO
1978 2963 36040 10.7 6679 WTO
1979 2939 36600 10.7 6732 WTO
1980 3195 40040 10.7 6787 WTO
1981 3263 42370 10.7 6936 WTO
1982 3257 41120 10.7 7152 WTO
1983 3197 42100 10.7 7044 WTO
1984 3177 41790 10.7 7277 WTO
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India:
1974 3689 17530 607.7 200 LDC
1975 4338 22880 621.0 215 LDC
1976 4824 24120 634.4 214 LDC
1977 5346 25340 647.5 227 LDC
1978 5646 29360 660.7 237 LDC
1979 5235 29180 674.5 221 LDC
1980 5441 31620 689.0 232 LDC
1981 5966 32600 704.2 238 LDC
1982 6222 35660 719.8 242 LDC
1983 6776 37990 735.6 254 LDC
1984 6903 44240 751.6 258 LDC
Indonesia:
1974 1331 8080 134.3 331 LDC
1975 1778 9932 137.5 339 LDC
1976 1757 11470 140.8 359 LDC
1977 1791 11120 144.3 378 LDC
1978 1913 12740 147.8 395 LDC
1979 1995 14580 151.4 405 LDC
1980 2089 16460 154.9 433 LDC
1981 2351 19380 158.5 463 LDC
1982 2373 17670 162.1 464 LDC
1983 2125 19130 165.8 467 LDC
1984 2138 17210 169.4 484 LDC
Kenya:
1974 53 804 13.0 294 LDC
1975 64 955 13.5 287 LDC
1976 58 993 14.0 279 LDC
1977 103 928 14.6 294 LDC
1978 186 1286 15.2 302 LDC
1979 233 1444 15.8 305 LDC
1980 223 1458 16.4 309 LDC
1981 166 1657 17.1 315 LDC
1982 211 1707 17.8 302 LDC
1983 207 1537 18.6 299 LDC
1984 190 1512 19.4 287 LDC
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Malaysia:
1974 659 4144 12.0 1316 LDC
1975 752 4928 12.3 1314 LDC
1976 706 5125 12.6 1422 LDC
1977 927 6021 12.8 1495 LDC
1978 790 6276 13.1 1548 LDC
1979 853 5939 13.4 1651 LDC
1980 1059 8098 13.8 1762 LDC
1981 1556 11400 14.1 1848 LDC
1982 1616 13420 14.4 1882 LDC
1983 1443 12210 14.8 1910 LDC
1984 1154 11210 15.1 1990 LDC
Mali:
1974 17 87 6.1 125 LDC
1975 20 95 6.2 138 LDC
1976 24 123 6.3 154 LDC
1977 27 145 6.5 162 LDC
1978 27 150 6.6 156 LDC
1979 27 157 6.8 169 LDC
1980 26 246 6.9 163 LDC
1981 25 248 7.1 154 LDC
1982 27 322 7.2 160 LDC
1983 27 340 7.4 149 LDC
1984 23 * 7.6 143 LDC
Mexico:
1974 595 13930 59.7 1592 LDC
1975 771 17360 61.5 1634 LDC
1976 709 18070 63.2 1650 LDC
1977 695 18030 64.9 1664 LDC
1978 561 19710 66.6 1754 LDC
1979 614 22960 68.4 1859 LDC
1980 570 26600 70.1 1941 LDC
1981 757 33230 71.9 2025 LDC
1982 725 47500 73.8 1893 LDC
1983 726 38180 75.7 1759 LDC
1984 934 35370 77.7 1795 LDC
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Nepal:
1974 12 188 13.0 152 LDC
1975 12 182 13.3 151 LDC
1976 16 224 13.6 154 LDC
1977 20 281 13.9 155 LDC
1978 19 292 14.3 158 LDC
1979 20 301 14.6 158 LDC
1980 21 319 15.0 151 LDC
1981 23 353 15.4 159 LDC
1982 23 425 15.8 161 LDC
1983 28 494 16.2 152 LDC
1984 31 495 16.6 159 LDC
Nigeria:
1974 2161 15830 74.8 984 LDC
1975 4016 25580 77.1 939 LDC
1976 3094 26680 79.5 1007 LDC
1977 3441 27900 81.9 1038 LDC
1978 2880 25590 84.5 956 LDC
1979 2385 27400 87.2 980 LDC
1980 2371 25390 90.0 965 LDC
1981 2271 16590 93.0 884 LDC
1982 1839 18980 95.9 827 LDC
1983 1644 16110 97.7 755 LDC
1984 1170 13040 99.9 697 LDC
Oman:
1974 650 2028 0.7 3094 LDC
1975 1213 2355 0.8 3872 LDC
1976 1283 2652 0.8 4354 LDC
1977 1059 2315 0.8 4345 LDC
1978 1095 2161 0.9 3909 LDC
1979 1029 2172 0.9 4741 LDC
1980 1428 2877 1.0 6613 LDC
1981 1694 3497 1.0 7165 LDC
1982 1762 3711 1.1 6695 LDC
1983 1944 3961 1.1 6226 LDC
1984 2040 4375 1.2 6245 LDC
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Pakistan:
1974 1034 3659 72.9 251 LDC
1975 1153 4352 74.7 253 LDC
1976 1193 4568 76.5 260 LDC
1977 1083 4551 78.2 266 LDC
1978 1165 4762 80.1 284 LDC
1979 1189 5507 82.4 290 LDC
1980 1292 5469 85.2 306 LDC
1981 1403 5909 88.4 316 LDC
1982 1568 5770 91.5 318 LDC
1983 1934 6671 94.1 332 LDC
1984 1923 7126 96.6 338 LDC
Papua New Guinea:
1974 * * * * LDC
1975 * * * * LDC
1976 31 676 2.7 768 LDC
1977 29 676 2.8 764 LDC
1978 33 765 2.8 813 LDC
1979 31 758 2.9 797 LDC
1980 35 811 3.0 741 LDC
1981 36 919 3.1 743 LDC
1982 34 869 3.1 714 LDC
1983 34 848 3.2 703 LDC
1984 39 833 3.3 704 LDC
Paraguay:
1974 46 352 2.8 1263 LDC
1975 70 431 2.9 1308 LDC
1976 72 492 3.0 1353 LDC
1977 79 516 3.1 1487 LDC
1978 81 589 3.2 1576 LDC
1979 82 611 3.3 1708 LDC
1980 90 674 3.4 1825 LDC
1981 105 791 3.5 1928 LDC
1982 120 749 3.6 1852 LDC
1983 163 728 3.7 1736 LDC
1984 114 791 3.9 1753 LDC
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Peru:
1974 569 2808 14.8 1239 LDC
1975 757 3172 15.2 1246 LDC
1976 882 3352 15.6 1224 LDC
1977 1291 3282 16.0 1191 LDC
1978 969 3026 16.4 1076 LDC
1979 621 2903 16.8 1159 LDC
1980 1030 3811 17.3 1207 LDC
1981 924 3899 17.8 1227 LDC
1982 1015 3363 18.2 1199 LDC
1983 921 3069 18.7 1008 LDC
1984 1402 2962 19.2 1021 LDC
Philippines:
1974 433 2614 43.3 515 LDC
1975 732 3761 44.4 532 LDC
1976 778 3900 45.6 555 LDC
1977 761 4004 46.8 576 LDC
1978 572 4218 48.0 594 LDC
1979 699 4150 49.3 619 LDC
1980 619 4570 50.5 634 LDC
1981 602 5219 51.7 639 LDC
1982 558 5267 53.0 636 LDC
1983 549 4776 54.3 628 LDC
1984 383 4031 55.5 572 LDC
Poland:
1974 10740 50100 33.6 6027 WTO
1975 11030 61500 34.0 6265 WTO
1976 11450 61320 34.3 6368 WTO
1977 11710 66730 34.6 6471 WTO
1978 11440 71510 34.9 6588 WTO
1979 11480 78320 35.3 6463 WTO
1980 11570 83670 35.6 6245 WTO
1981 11500 86630 35.9 5947 WTO
1982 12920 60530 36.2 5798 WTO
1983 12240 52550 36.6 5986 WTO
1984 12990 58080 36.9 6159 WTO
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Romania:
1974 4848 35260 21.0 4006 WTO
1975 4951 38400 21.2 4151 WTO
1976 5111 41230 21.4 4562 WTO
1977 5040 44670 21.7 4591 WTO
1978 4970 45880 21.9 4797 WTO
1979 4841 51010 22.0 4967 WTO
1980 4591 42160 22.2 4854 WTO
1981 4563 36700 22.4 4905 WTO
1982 5140 28670 22.5 4974 WTO
1983 5189 24910 22.6 4926 WTO
1984 5172 26520 22.6 5149 WTO
Senegal:
1974 27 387 4.9 370 LDC
1975 40 391 5.0 391 LDC
1976 60 435 5.1 423 LDC
1977 73 445 5.3 393 LDC
1978 76 389 5.4 354 LDC
1979 76 420 5.6 379 LDC
1980 83 500 5.8 354 LDC
1981 64 547 5.9 338 LDC
1982 65 665 6.1 378 LDC
1983 64 661 6.3 370 LDC
1984 61 732 6.5 339 LDC
Singapore:
1974 389 1745 2.2 3768 LDC
1975 446 2200 2.3 4013 LDC
1976 523 2298 2.3 4191 LDC
1977 637 2500 2.3 4435 LDC
1978 606 2631 2.4 4826 LDC
1979 604 2857 2.4 5181 LDC
1980 704 3378 2.4 5458 LDC
1981 785 4451 2.4 5939 LDC
1982 809 4521 2.5 6285 LDC
1983 724 5232 2.5 6772 LDC
1984 982 4693 2.5 7355 LDC
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Somalia:
1974 47 223 4.0 253 LDC
1975 44 211 4.1 320 LDC
1976 43 213 4.2 309 LDC
1977 47 289 4.3 342 LDC
1978 101 413 4.7 341 LDC
1979 94 551 5.2 269 LDC
1980 79 426 6.1 218 LDC
1981 76 305 6.7 212 LDC
1982 85 423 7.0 215 LDC
1983 82 363 7.2 213 LDC
1984 103 373 7.4 213 LDC
South Africa:
1974 1964 17310 24.9 2606 LDC
1975 2454 18710 25.5 2582 LDC
1976 3268 19780 26.1 2556 LDC
1977 3489 19750 26.7 2492 LDC
1978 3257 20300 27.4 2503 LDC
1979 3132 20410 28.0 2545 LDC
1980 3896 20200 28.7 2625 LDC
1981 3364 22030 29.4 2683 LDC
1982 2907 22960 30.2 2604 LDC
1983 3737 23900 30.9 2484 LDC
1984 3422 25980 31.7 2553 LDC
Soviet Union:
1974 207300 335300 252.1 6352 WTO
1975 210000 298600 254.5 6419 WTO
1976 217300 325100 256.8 6598 WTO
1977 220500 342300 259.0 6738 WTO
1978 225300 360700 261.3 6931 WTO
1979 231000 392100 263.4 6906 WTO
1980 237200 428400 265.5 6968 WTO
1981 238500 459100 267.7 6993 WTO
1982 242700 505200 270.0 7088 WTO
1983 247000 508000 272.5 7214 WTO
1984 251300 528800 275.0 7266 WTO
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Sri Lanka:
1974 45 733 13.4 239 LDC
1975 54 876 13.7 250 LDC
1976 50 969 13.9 253 LDC
1977 42 866 14.1 263 LDC
1978 51 1589 14.4 273 LDC
1979 64 1590 14.6 285 LDC
1980 65 1884 14.9 296 LDC
1981 58 1580 15.2 303 LDC
1982 60 1691 15.4 310 LDC
1983 75 1726 15.7 320 LDC
1984 83 1754 16.0 333 LDC
Syria:
1974 1271 3533 7.2 1439 LDC
1975 1987 5861 7.4 1709 LDC
1976 1978 6550 7.7 1779 LDC
1977 1895 6457 7.9 1685 LDC
1978 2093 5865 8.2 1775 LDC
1979 2387 5877 8.5 1798 LDC
1980 2802 7827 8.8 1884 LDC
1981 2587 6858 9.1 2042 LDC
1982 2855 8286 9.4 2017 LDC
1983 4044 9863 9.8 1935 LDC
1984 4114 9873 10.2 1812 LDC
Tanzania:
1974 162 1345 15.3 343 LDC
1975 209 1759 15.8 344 LDC
1976 168 1373 16.3 346 LDC
1977 179 1469 16.9 337 LDC
1978 242 1645 17.4 331 LDC
1979 543 2101 18.0 331 LDC
1980 164 1787 18.5 335 LDC
1981 202 1698 19.1 320 LDC
1982 246 1961 19.7 313 LDC
1983 229 1731 20.4 301 LDC
1984 208 1626 21.0 300 LDC
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Thailand:
1974 591 2939 41.2 551 LDC
1975 627 3650 42.1 573 LDC
1976 777 4418 43.1 607 LDC
1977 900 4673 44.1 636 LDC
1978 1142 5324 45.0 679 LDC
1979 1349 5705 45.9 698 LDC
1980 1359 6489 46.9 722 LDC
1981 1352 6632 47.8 742 LDC
1982 1508 7815 48.8 754 LDC
1983 1519 7933 49.7 786 LDC
1984 1626 8206 50.6 814 LDC
Togo:
1974 8 95 2.2 291 LDC
1975 11 173 2.3 289 LDC
1976 12 213 2.3 276 LDC
1977 42 309 2.4 286 LDC
1978 38 437 2.4 308 LDC
1979 18 335 2.5 285 LDC
1980 18 268 2.6 312 LDC
1981 19 264 2.7 286 LDC
1982 18 249 2.8 266 LDC
1983 16 240 2.8 240 LDC
1984 18 282 2.9 237 LDC
Trinidad anc Tobago:
1974 12 1135 1.0 4458 LDC
1975 13 1181 1.0 5110 LDC
1976 35 1795 1.0 5762 LDC
1977 34 1891 1.0 6076 LDC
1978 46 2303 1.1 6610 LDC
1979 59 2667 1.1 6519 LDC
1980 41 2794 1.1 7213 LDC
1981 50 3258 1.1 7225 LDC
1982 149 4054 1.1 7211 LDC
1983 227 5000 1.1 6607 LDC
1984 183 3048 1.2 5839 LDC
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Tunisia:
1974 68 1320 5.6 881 LDC
1975 84 1644 5.7 920 LDC
1976 81 1824 5.9 957 LDC
1977 86 2122 6.0 965 LDC
1978 95 2294 6.2 1004 LDC
1979 345 2550 6.3 1042 LDC
1980 282 2546 6.5 1096 LDC
1981 210 2674 6.7 1120 LDC
1982 312 3112 6.8 1092 LDC
1983 383 3407 6.9 1126 LDC
1984 265 3543 7.1 1164 LDC
Uganda:
1974 247 1267 10.8 689 LDC
1975 192 1055 11.1 642 LDC
1976 187 1039 11.4 637 LDC
1977 134 638 11.8 625 LDC
1978 116 581 12.1 563 LDC
1979 61 320 12.5 467 LDC
1980 49 201 12.8 434 LDC
1981 52 173 13.1 447 LDC
1982 47 290 13.4 475 LDC
1983 51 355 13.8 483 LDC
1984 75 453 14.2 494 LDC
United Arab Emirates:
1974 41 382 0.4 33050 LDC
1975 59 559 0.5 32110 LDC
1976 139 1115 0.6 33750 LDC
1977 810 2606 0.7 34940 LDC
1978 1172 2908 0.8 27040 LDC
1979 1580 3114 0.9 29800 LDC
1980 2087 5046 1.0 34030 LDC
1981 2340 6132 1.1 32290 LDC
1982 2071 6342 1.2 26650 LDC
1983 1973 5135 1.2 22220 LDC
1984 1868 4652 1.2 20300 LDC
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Uruguay:
1974 132 1122 2.8 1625 LDC
1975 133 1144 2.8 1709 LDC
1976 112 1248 2.9 1772 LDC
1977 121 1255 2.9 1797 LDC
1978 123 1274 2.9 1878 LDC
1979 137 1228 2.9 2001 LDC
1980 180 1366 2.9 2108 LDC
1981 244 1584 2.9 2153 LDC
1982 228 1727 2.9 1916 LDC
1983 170 1373 2.9 1739 LDC
1984 139 1280 2.9 1663 LDC
Venezuela:
1974 987 20360 12.2 4558 LDC
1975 1172 20710 12.7 4781 LDC
1976 928 21270 13.1 4997 LDC
1977 1087 22330 13.6 5137 LDC
1978 1131 21060 14.1 5105 LDC
1979 1036 16320 14.6 4974 LDC
1980 903 18590 15.0 4694 LDC
1981 807 25150 15.5 4519 LDC
1982 1196 23470 15.9 4337 LDC
1983 995 19150 16.4 3984 LDC
1984 1031 18170 16.9 3822 LDC
Yugoslavia:
1974 1733 8201 21.2 1675 LDC
1975 1891 8206 21.3 1671 LDC
1976 1804 8834 21.6 1740 LDC
1977 1859 4339 21.8 1873 LDC
1978 1845 4137 21.9 2013 LDC
1979 1975 4360 22.1 2098 LDC
1980 2013 4147 22.3 2108 LDC
1981 1942 3850 22.5 2108 LDC
1982 1785 3558 22.6 2116 LDC
1983 1665 3582 22.8 2052 LDC
1984 1731 3478 23.0 2071 LDC
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